Deep Dive Instantly.ai Review June 2026
Is Instantly the best cold email marketing tool right now? I test it out!
Last updated July 2026
This page covers both halves of the site. For how we estimate net worth, jump to How We Calculate Net Worth. For how we test and score software, start here.
We put every tool through the same process before we write a word about it. The goal is simple: figure out whether it genuinely helps your business run better, save time, or bring in more revenue, and then say so plainly.
We test with real, paid accounts and live with each tool inside the kind of workflows people actually run. Demos and sales pages only show the polished version. We want to see where it gets clunky, what breaks under normal use, and how much setup it really takes before you get any value out of it. Because software ships changes constantly, we revisit our picks so the advice stays current.
Tested on real paid accounts and live workflows before we write anything.
We buy our own subscriptions and answer to readers first.
Reviews are refreshed as tools ship new features and pricing.
No amount of money buys a higher score or a better ranking.
We spell out the obvious strengths and the less obvious weaknesses, then say who a tool fits well and who should look elsewhere. For outreach and marketing platforms we dig into deliverability, warmup performance, inbox placement, and whether the sending limits hold up once real volume flows through. Whatever the category, we note what changed since our last look so you always see the current picture.
Each tool is judged on the same six criteria. That keeps our reviews consistent and lets you compare options on the things that actually decide whether a purchase pays off.
Does it do the core job reliably when you put real work through it?
How quickly you get from signup to real value, and how much friction is in the way.
What you actually pay at real usage levels, weighed against what the tool saves or earns.
How fast and how useful help is when something goes wrong.
How cleanly it fits the stack most teams already run every day.
Whether it holds up as your volume, team, and needs grow.
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The same way we used to lay out every assumption and variable when breaking down net worth numbers, we show our reasoning so you can decide whether the conclusions make sense for your own business.
Rates and measured data current as of 2026-07-18.
Prefer the story to the tables? How we calculate celebrity net worth, behind the scenes walks through how this system was built, including the mistakes that shaped the rules.
Every YouTuber page on this site is computed by one deterministic program from three kinds of input: measured public data, published rate tables, and documented one-off facts such as a company sale. The same inputs always produce the same number. Nothing on a page is written by hand, and any income lane we cannot yet support with public data is listed openly as one we are still sourcing.
Every line item carries a tier: DISCLOSED (someone with the real number said it on the record), MEASURED (we counted it in public data), MODELED (measured quantity times a sourced rate), and every revenue lane carries one of these tiers. A page’s grade is the share of its value sitting in the first two tiers: A is 60% or more, B is 30%, C is anything below. Most YouTuber pages are C, which is honest: most of a career is modeled, and the grade says how much.
RPM is revenue per thousand views after YouTube’s cut. Base cells take the median of their rows, US and global rows only, each row first normalized to the modern era. Rows flagged as upper bounds are shown but excluded from medians. Other geographies enter through the multiplier table, never the base.
| Who | Genre | Audience | Year | Format | RPM | What was disclosed | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Josh Mayo | finance | us_tier1 | 2024 | long_form | $29.30 | creator-stated RPM after pivot to credit cards/investing topics (via aggregator) | post-bridge.com |
| aggregate | general | global | 2025 | long_form | $3.50 | aggregator: most creators earn $2-10 RPM; $3-5 most common (midpoint used) | post-bridge.com |
| aggregate | shorts | global | 2025 | shorts | $0.04 | aggregator: Shorts ~$0.04 per 1k views | post-bridge.com |
| Shelby Church (main) | tech_lifestyle | us_tier1 | 2021 | long_form | $9.72 | creator-disclosed RPM $9.72 (CPM $24.59) on main channel | vidchops.com |
| Shelby Church (vlog) | tech_lifestyle | us_tier1 | 2021 | long_form | $11.49 | creator-disclosed RPM $11.49 (CPM $27.87); longer videos = more ad breaks | vidchops.com |
| Graham Stephan | finance | us_tier1 | 2020 | long_form | $18.00 | creator-disclosed RPM $16-20 (midpoint), peak months $30+; $2M+ from 134M views | outlierkit.com |
| forum creator | gaming | us_tier1 | 2013 | long_form | $3.89 | creator-disclosed avg RPM for gaming videos 2011-2015 (forum post; medium quality) | blackhatworld.com |
| aggregate | shorts | global | 2024 | shorts | $0.04 | typical Shorts RPM $0.01-0.07 per aggregate benchmarks | influencermarketinghub.com |
| aggregate | shorts | us_tier1 | 2025 | shorts | $0.32 | US Shorts RPM case studies up to $0.32 after 2025 parity push (upper bound, not median) | air.io |
| aggregate | general | india | 2026 | long_form | $0.40 | India RPM Rs15-50 per 1k (~$0.18-0.60, midpoint); median CPM $0.70-0.83 | upgrowth.in |
| Hank Green | cross_platform | us_tier1 | 2022 | tiktok_creator_fund | $0.03 | disclosed TikTok creator fund payout 2.5 cents per 1,000 views | tubefilter.com |
| AIR network study | auto | global | 2026 | long_form | $5.69 | Transport niche (car/aviation/build) median RPM from real YouTube Analytics of AIR's 300-channel network (3595 monetized months May 2025-May 2026); P25-P75 $3.17-9.81; 7 channels so directional | air.io |
| aggregate | auto | global | 2026 | long_form | $9.00 | aggregator: automotive creator RPM $4-14 (midpoint used); CPM $8-25 | miraflow.ai |
| Doug DeMuro | auto | us_tier1 | 2018 | long_form | $10.00 | creator-stated upper bound not median: a good video earned $1 per <100 views (RPM >=$10) with many videos hitting it in strong months (My First Million #456 at 40:11) | youtube.com |
| Doug DeMuro | auto | us_tier1 | 2017 | long_form | $2.11 | derived: creator-stated ad revenue of $20k Dec 2016 + $8k Jan 2017 (My First Million #456 at 8:13) over 13.25M channel views in those two months per Internet Archive Social Blade snapshots (2016-07-08, 2017-01-05, 2017-02-09); December window start interpolated across a six-month snapshot gap so the denominator is approximate; window spans the seasonal peak and trough | youtube.com |
| AIR network study | science_diy | global | 2026 | long_form | $10.22 | Education & Science niche median RPM from real YouTube Analytics of AIR's 300-channel network (3595 monetized months May 2025-May 2026); P25-P75 $2.31-19.50; best monetized rate in study (77%) | air.io |
| aggregate | science_diy | global | 2026 | long_form | $10.00 | aggregator: education creator RPM $5-15 (midpoint used); nearest published niche to science/DIY | miraflow.ai |
| aggregate | science_diy | global | 2026 | long_form | $5.32 | 'science explained humorously' niche RPM from creator dashboards + industry surveys + OutlierKit analytics, verified June 2026 | outlierkit.com |
| aggregate | real_estate | global | 2026 | long_form | $14.00 | aggregator: real estate creator RPM $8-20 (midpoint used); CPM $15-38; noted to swing with housing-market conditions | miraflow.ai |
| aggregate | kids | global | 2025 | long_form | $2.00 | made-for-kids inventory serves contextual ads only under COPPA; aggregator range $1-3 RPM (midpoint used) vs $5-15 general | gyre.pro |
| aggregate | kids | global | 2025 | long_form | $1.25 | made-for-kids channels typically $0.50-2 RPM with behavioral targeting disabled (midpoint used) | pastory.app |
Two luxury-real-estate creator disclosures exist beyond this table. Enes Yilmazer told the Wall Street Journal in April 2021 he was earning $50,000 to $100,000 a month from YouTube ads, and Erik Conover told the same reporter $10,000 to $30,000 a month. Neither disclosure can be turned into a rate: Yilmazer’s channel has no archived Social Blade snapshots at all, and Conover’s nearest snapshots sit 21 months apart around the disclosure window, wide enough that a derived denominator would be a guess. Both disclosures corroborate the real-estate cell’s direction without being median rows. The cell rests on one aggregate row for now, and the affected page carries a warning saying exactly that.
| Genre cell | Base RPM | How |
|---|---|---|
| auto | $5.69 | median of the rows above, era-normalized |
| finance | $23.65 | median of the rows above, era-normalized |
| gaming | $3.50 | median of the rows above, era-normalized |
| general | $3.50 | median of the rows above, era-normalized |
| kids | $1.62 | median of the rows above, era-normalized |
| real_estate | $14.00 | median of the rows above, era-normalized |
| science_diy | $10.00 | median of the rows above, era-normalized |
| tech_lifestyle | $10.61 | median of the rows above, era-normalized |
| shorts (all genres) | $0.04 | median of Shorts rows; $0 before 2023-02 |
| Kind | Key | Multiplier | Tier | Basis | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| era | pre2012 | 0.40 | MODELED | assumption: ad market immaturity pre-2012; pending historical disclosures | assumption |
| era | 2012_2016 | 0.60 | MODELED | assumption: partial contradiction from gaming 2011-15 disclosure ($3.89 vs $3.50 modern); midpoint stance pending more data | assumption |
| era | 2017_2019 | 0.80 | MODELED | assumption: adpocalypse-era advertiser pullback | assumption |
| era | 2020_plus | 1.00 | MODELED | modern base era: matches vintage of most RPM disclosures | assumption |
| geo | us_tier1 | 1.00 | MODELED | base geography of most disclosures | assumption |
| geo | eu_tier1 | 0.80 | MODELED | assumption pending EU disclosures | assumption |
| geo | latam | 0.30 | MODELED | assumption anchored loosely to india ratio (0.11) and v1 practice (0.43-0.75); pending LatAm disclosures | assumption |
| geo | india | 0.11 | MEASURED_RATIO | india RPM $0.40 / general $3.50 from sourced rows | derived_from_rpm_disclosures |
| geo | mixed_global | 0.70 | MODELED | assumption for globally mixed audiences | assumption |
| Type | Cell | Year | Rate type | Rate | Notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| industry_guide | baseline_integration | 2026 | cpm_per_1k_views | $50.00 | integrations baseline $30-70 per 1k views (midpoint) | creatorsagency.co |
| industry_guide | all_niches_range | 2026 | cpm_per_1k_views | $47.50 | overall range $15-80 CPM for integrations (midpoint) | outlierkit.com |
| industry_guide | finance | 2026 | cpm_per_1k_views | $125 | finance/investing $50-200 CPM (midpoint); highest vertical | outlierkit.com |
| industry_guide | format_multiplier_dedicated | 2026 | multiplier | $1.40 | dedicated videos 1.3-1.5x integration baseline | creatorsagency.co |
| industry_guide | format_multiplier_short_mention | 2026 | multiplier | $0.80 | sub-60s mentions 0.7-0.9x baseline | creatorsagency.co |
| industry_guide | b2b_saas_multiplier | 2026 | multiplier | $2.15 | B2B SaaS pays 1.8-2.5x baseline; lifestyle 0.7-0.9x | outlierkit.com |
| industry_guide | lifestyle_multiplier | 2026 | multiplier | $0.80 | lifestyle pays 0.7-0.9x baseline | outlierkit.com |
| assumption | management_fee | 2026 | fee_share | $0.15 | talent management 10-20% on brand deals (midpoint); PENDING SOURCE | assumption |
| industry_guide | gaming_absolute | 2026 | cpm_per_1k_views | $17.50 | gaming integrations $10-25 CPM (midpoint); younger audience, lower pricing | influencerfee.com |
| industry_guide | gaming_absolute | 2026 | cpm_per_1k_views | $10.00 | gaming $5-15 CPM range (midpoint); lower-bound source | creatorsjet.com |
Effective rates by jurisdiction and year, applied to the residence timeline documented on each page. Corporate structuring that would lower these rates is ignored, which slightly overstates tax and keeps our estimates cautious.
| Jurisdiction | Years | Income type | Rate | Basis | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| US-CA | 2018–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | fed top 37% (TCJA) effective ~34% at $1M+ plus CA ~11% effective; S-corp/QBI mitigations ignored (overstates tax = floor) | irs.gov |
| US-CA | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 47% | fed top 39.6% + CA 13.3% (Prop 30) effective blend at $1M+ | irs.gov |
| US-CA | 2003–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 43% | fed top 35% + CA ~10% effective | irs.gov |
| US-no-income-tax-state | 2018–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 33% | fed only (TX/FL/WA/TN); effective ~33% at $1M+ | irs.gov |
| US-CA | 2013–2026 | long_term_capital_gains | 35% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% + CA taxes gains as ordinary ~11% effective | irs.gov |
| US-no-income-tax-state | 2013–2026 | long_term_capital_gains | 24% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% | irs.gov |
| UK | 2010–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 40% | 45% additional rate marginal; effective ~40% at high income; Ltd-company dividend planning ignored (overstates = floor) | gov.uk |
| Sweden | 2010–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 52% | municipal ~32% + state 20-25% top; effective ~52% | skatteverket.se |
| Japan | 2015–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 48% | national top 45% + 10% inhabitant tax; effective ~48% at high income | nta.go.jp |
| Brazil-PJ | 2015–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 20% | creators bill via pessoa juridica (Simples/Lucro Presumido) effective ~15-25%; replaces v1's 50% overcharge | gov.br |
| US-CA | 1984–1986 | ordinary_creator_income | 55% | fed top 50% (pre-TRA86) + CA ~11%; effective blend at top incomes | taxfoundation.org |
| US-CA | 1987–1987 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | TRA86 transition year fed top 38.5% + CA | taxfoundation.org |
| US-CA | 1988–1992 | ordinary_creator_income | 36% | fed top 28-31% (TRA86 era) + CA 9.3% | taxfoundation.org |
| US-CA | 1993–2002 | ordinary_creator_income | 46% | fed top 39.6% (OBRA93) + CA 9.3-11% | taxfoundation.org |
| US-CA | 1970–1981 | investment_returns | 35% | fed LTCG max ~28-35% and bond coupons at high ordinary rates; blended effective on a 60/40's total return, CA on top | taxfoundation.org |
| US-CA | 1982–1996 | investment_returns | 30% | fed LTCG 20% (1982-86) then 28% (1987-96) plus CA ~9-11% (gains taxed as ordinary in CA) and ordinary rates on bond coupons; blended effective | taxfoundation.org |
| US-CA | 1997–2012 | investment_returns | 25% | fed LTCG 20% (1997-2002) then 15% (2003-12) plus CA ordinary treatment of gains; blended effective | taxfoundation.org |
| US-CA | 2013–2026 | investment_returns | 30% | fed LTCG 20% + NIIT 3.8% + CA up to 13.3% (gains ordinary in CA); blended effective on the 60/40's total return | taxfoundation.org |
| UK | 2010–2026 | investment_returns | 24% | CGT 20% higher-rate plus dividend additional rates; blended effective on a 60/40's total return | gov.uk |
| UK | 1988–2009 | ordinary_creator_income | 40% | top rate 40% from 1988-89 through 2009-10; effective ~40% at high income | ifs.org.uk |
| UK | 1988–2007 | investment_returns | 40% | CGT charged at marginal income-tax rates 1988-2008, top 40% | ifs.org.uk |
| UK | 2008–2009 | investment_returns | 18% | single 18% CGT rate 2008-2010 | ifs.org.uk |
| US-NY | 1984–1986 | ordinary_creator_income | 55% | fed top 50% era plus NYS+NYC; mirrors the US-CA blend, NY combined top rates track CA within a point | tax.ny.gov |
| US-NY | 1987–1987 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | TRA86 transition year plus NYS+NYC | tax.ny.gov |
| US-NY | 1988–1992 | ordinary_creator_income | 36% | fed 28-31% plus NYS+NYC | tax.ny.gov |
| US-NY | 1993–2002 | ordinary_creator_income | 46% | fed 39.6% plus NYS+NYC | tax.ny.gov |
| US-NY | 2003–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 43% | fed 35% plus NYS+NYC | tax.ny.gov |
| US-NY | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 47% | fed 39.6% plus NYS 8.82% + NYC | tax.ny.gov |
| US-NY | 2018–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | fed 37% plus NYS up to 10.9% + NYC | tax.ny.gov |
| US-NY | 1970–1981 | investment_returns | 35% | mirrors US-CA blend: high LTCG era plus ordinary-rate bond coupons, state on top | tax.ny.gov |
| US-NY | 1982–1996 | investment_returns | 30% | fed LTCG 20-28% plus NYS+NYC ordinary treatment | tax.ny.gov |
| US-NY | 1997–2012 | investment_returns | 25% | fed LTCG 15-20% plus NYS+NYC | tax.ny.gov |
| US-NY | 2013–2026 | investment_returns | 30% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% + NYS+NYC ordinary treatment of gains | tax.ny.gov |
| US-MS | 1987–1992 | ordinary_creator_income | 34% | fed 28-31% plus MS ~5% | dor.ms.gov |
| US-MS | 1993–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 43% | fed 39.6/35% plus MS 5% | dor.ms.gov |
| US-MS | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 44% | fed 39.6% plus MS 5% | dor.ms.gov |
| US-MS | 2018–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 41% | fed 37% plus MS ~4.7-5% | dor.ms.gov |
| US-MS | 1987–1996 | investment_returns | 31% | fed LTCG 28% plus MS 5% ordinary treatment | dor.ms.gov |
| US-MS | 1997–2012 | investment_returns | 23% | fed LTCG 15-20% plus MS 5% | dor.ms.gov |
| US-MS | 2013–2026 | investment_returns | 28% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus MS ~5% | dor.ms.gov |
| US-no-income-tax-state | 2013–2026 | investment_returns | 24% | fed LTCG 20% + NIIT 3.8%, no state income tax (e.g. Florida) | irs.gov |
| US-no-income-tax-state | 1993–2002 | ordinary_creator_income | 42% | fed 39.6% effective at high income, no state income tax (e.g. Texas, Florida) | irs.gov |
| US-no-income-tax-state | 2003–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 37% | fed 35% effective, no state income tax | irs.gov |
| US-no-income-tax-state | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 42% | fed 39.6% + ACA surtaxes, no state income tax | irs.gov |
| US-no-income-tax-state | 1982–1996 | investment_returns | 25% | fed LTCG 20-28% and ordinary-rate bond coupons, no state | irs.gov |
| US-no-income-tax-state | 1997–2012 | investment_returns | 18% | fed LTCG 15-20%, no state | irs.gov |
| Spain | 2006–2014 | ordinary_creator_income | 43% | top marginal 43% (2007-09) rising to 52% (2012-14 austerity years); effective blend at her income level | sede.agenciatributaria.gob.es |
| Spain | 2006–2014 | investment_returns | 21% | savings income taxed at flat 18-27% across the era | sede.agenciatributaria.gob.es |
| US-VT | 2018–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 43% | fed top 37% effective ~34% at $1M+ plus VT top 8.75% | tax.vermont.gov |
| US-VT | 2018–2026 | investment_returns | 30% | fed LTCG 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus VT ordinary treatment up to 8.75% with a partial exclusion; blended effective | tax.vermont.gov |
| France | 2010–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | top marginal 45% plus high-income surcharge 3-4%; effective blend at high income | impots.gouv.fr |
| France | 2010–2026 | investment_returns | 30% | PFU flat 30% on investment income since 2018; earlier dividend/CGT blends similar | impots.gouv.fr |
| Australia | 2008–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | top marginal 45% plus 2% Medicare levy; effective blend at high income | ato.gov.au |
| Australia | 2008–2026 | investment_returns | 24% | top rate on gains after the 50% CGT discount; blended effective | ato.gov.au |
| US-NC | 2012–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 41% | fed top 39.6% effective ~35% at high income plus NC 5.75-5.499% flat | irs.gov |
| US-NC | 2018–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 38% | fed top 37% (TCJA) effective ~33% at high income plus NC flat rate stepping 5.25% down to 4.5% | ncdor.gov |
| US-GA | 2021–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 38% | fed top 37% effective ~33% at $1M+ plus GA 5.75% (5.39% flat from 2024; 5.19% 2026) | dor.georgia.gov |
| US-OH | 2013–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 37% | fed effective ~33% at $1M+ plus OH top bracket ~4% (4.797% pre-2021 then 3.99%; 3.5% from 2024) | tax.ohio.gov |
| US-PR | 2021–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 28% | bona fide PR resident under Act 60: mainland-source fight and appearance and US-platform income keeps federal rates while PR-source export-services and investment income runs 4% and 0%; 28% blend weighted toward the federally taxed mainland income | hklaw.com |
| US-NJ | 1982–1986 | ordinary_creator_income | 50% | fed top 50% era plus NJ 2.5%, well below the NY/CA state layer | nj.gov |
| US-NJ | 1987–1987 | ordinary_creator_income | 41% | TRA86 transition year plus NJ 3.5% | nj.gov |
| US-NJ | 1988–1992 | ordinary_creator_income | 33% | fed 28-31% plus NJ 3.5% | nj.gov |
| US-NJ | 1993–2002 | ordinary_creator_income | 44% | fed 39.6% plus NJ 6.37% | nj.gov |
| US-NJ | 2003–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 42% | fed 35% plus NJ 8.97% | nj.gov |
| US-NJ | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 46% | fed 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus NJ 8.97% | nj.gov |
| US-NJ | 2018–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 44% | fed 37% plus NJ up to 10.75% | nj.gov |
| US-NJ | 1982–1996 | investment_returns | 28% | fed LTCG 20-28% plus NJ ordinary treatment | nj.gov |
| US-NJ | 1997–2012 | investment_returns | 23% | fed LTCG 15-20% plus NJ | nj.gov |
| US-NJ | 2013–2026 | investment_returns | 28% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus NJ ordinary treatment of gains | nj.gov |
| US-IN | 2013–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 38% | fed effective ~33% at $1M+ plus IN flat state rate (3.4% 2013-14, 3.23% 2017-22, 3.05% 2024, 2.95% 2026) plus county local income tax (Marion County 2.02%) | in.gov |
| US-IN | 2013–2026 | investment_returns | 29% | fed LTCG 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus IN flat-rate ordinary treatment of gains plus county local income tax; blended effective on the 60/40's total return | in.gov |
| US-CA | 1955–1963 | ordinary_creator_income | 53% | fed top 91% marginal (1954-63), effective blend ~47% at $1M+ well under the headline after averaging, shelters and the era's alternative maximum; plus CA ~6-7% | taxfoundation.org |
| US-CA | 1964–1964 | ordinary_creator_income | 53% | Revenue Act of 1964 transition year fed top 77% marginal effective ~46% plus CA ~7% | taxfoundation.org |
| US-CA | 1965–1970 | ordinary_creator_income | 54% | fed top 70% marginal effective ~45% at high income (still no cap on earned income) plus CA ~8-9% rising toward the 1973 plateau | taxfoundation.org |
| US-CA | 1971–1983 | ordinary_creator_income | 55% | TRA69's maximum tax on earned income (60% in 1971, 50% from 1972) then ERTA's 50% top rate from 1982 kept the federal effective near 44% on salary and fee income; plus CA reaching 11% by 1973 | taxfoundation.org |
| US-CA | 1955–1969 | investment_returns | 27% | 25% alternative-tax ceiling on long-term gains (1954-67, still in force through 1969 before TRA69's minimum tax on preferences hit 1970 returns) plus bond coupons at ordinary rates and CA ~6-7% | taxfoundation.org |
| US-NY | 1975–1977 | ordinary_creator_income | 56% | fed 50%-cap era (~44% effective) plus NY's all-time peak, 15% state topped by a brief surcharge (15.375% in 1975) and NYC up to 4.3%, combined state and city near 19.7% in 1976 | tax.ny.gov |
| US-NY | 1978–1981 | ordinary_creator_income | 55% | fed 50%-cap era plus NY's earned-income top rate phased down from 15% to 10% over these years plus NYC | tax.ny.gov |
| US-NY | 1982–1983 | ordinary_creator_income | 54% | fed 50% (ERTA) plus NY settled near 10% state plus NYC; mirrors US-CA just ahead of the 1984 row | tax.ny.gov |
| US-no-income-tax-state | 1966–1970 | ordinary_creator_income | 42% | fed top 70% marginal, effective ~42% at high income after averaging and shelters, no state income tax | taxfoundation.org |
| US-no-income-tax-state | 1971–1986 | ordinary_creator_income | 40% | TRA69's maximum tax on earned income (60% in 1971, 50% from 1972) then ERTA's 50% top rate from 1982, a harder ceiling than the old 70% bracket; no state income tax | taxfoundation.org |
| US-no-income-tax-state | 1987–1987 | ordinary_creator_income | 36% | TRA86 transition year fed top 38.5%, no state income tax | taxfoundation.org |
| US-no-income-tax-state | 1988–1992 | ordinary_creator_income | 30% | fed 28-31% (TRA86 era), no state income tax | taxfoundation.org |
| US-no-income-tax-state | 1966–1969 | investment_returns | 22% | 25% alternative-tax ceiling on long-term gains, no state, before TRA69's minimum tax on preferences hit 1970 returns | taxfoundation.org |
| US-no-income-tax-state | 1970–1981 | investment_returns | 29% | fed LTCG effective rate climbed toward its historical peak as the minimum tax on excluded gains stacked the alternative tax up near 39.875% by 1976, plus bond coupons at ordinary rates, no state | taxfoundation.org |
| UK | 1939–1945 | ordinary_creator_income | 58% | wartime escalation, standard rate plus surtax rose from 29%+41% (1939, over GBP 50k) to 50%+48% (1944/45, over GBP 20k) for a 98% nominal ceiling; effective blend well under that given wartime reliefs | ifs.org.uk |
| UK | 1946–1973 | ordinary_creator_income | 56% | postwar surtax system kept the nominal top rate around 90-97.5% into the 1960s; effective blend well under the headline given reliefs and avoidance | ifs.org.uk |
| UK | 1974–1978 | ordinary_creator_income | 52% | 83% top rate on earned income from 1974 under the unified system; the top 1% paid just 11% of all income tax collected in 1978/79, evidence of how far effective fell below headline | ifs.org.uk |
| UK | 1979–1987 | ordinary_creator_income | 47% | the 1979 budget cut the top rate from 83% to 60%; effective blend at high income ahead of the 1988 cut to 40% | ifs.org.uk |
| UK | 1939–1964 | investment_returns | 25% | no UK capital gains tax existed before 1965, so the 60% gains share of a blended return went untaxed; the 40% dividend and interest share paid the era's high unearned-income rates | tax.org.uk |
| UK | 1965–1973 | investment_returns | 39% | the 1965 Finance Act introduced a flat 30% capital gains tax while dividends and interest stayed inside the old surtax system at high unearned-income rates | tax.org.uk |
| UK | 1974–1978 | investment_returns | 42% | 30% flat CGT continued while the income share of the blend faced the 83% rate plus a 15% investment income surcharge (98% combined) | ifs.org.uk |
| UK | 1979–1987 | investment_returns | 35% | 30% flat CGT continued while the income share fell with the 1979 rate cut to 60% and the surcharge wound down, abolished in 1985 | ifs.org.uk |
| Spain | 2005–2005 | ordinary_creator_income | 44% | 45% top state+regional marginal under the 2003-06 regime; Beckham Law launched this year at a 24% flat rate but was closed to professional athletes by a 2010 amendment, so this row uses the ordinary progressive schedule | sede.agenciatributaria.gob.es |
| Spain | 2005–2005 | investment_returns | 15% | pre-2007-reform: long-term gains (held over 1 year) taxed at a flat 15%; the unified savings-income (ahorro) schedule the 2006-2014 row uses did not start until 2007 | sede.agenciatributaria.gob.es |
| Spain | 2015–2020 | ordinary_creator_income | 43% | top state+regional marginal eased to roughly 43-45% after the 2015 Montoro reform pulled back the 2012-14 debt-crisis surcharge peak of 52%; effective blend at high income | sede.agenciatributaria.gob.es |
| Spain | 2015–2020 | investment_returns | 22% | 2015 reform introduced the tiered ahorro (savings) schedule at 19/21/23%; a $1M+ portfolio sits mostly in the 23% top tier | sede.agenciatributaria.gob.es |
| Spain | 2021–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 47% | 2021 reform added a new top state bracket above EUR300k pushing the combined state+regional marginal to roughly 47-49% nationally (higher still in Catalonia); effective blend at high income | sede.agenciatributaria.gob.es |
| Spain | 2021–2026 | investment_returns | 27% | ahorro top rate stepped up from 26% (2021-22) to 27-28% (2023-24) to 30% (2025-26 income); blended across the era | sede.agenciatributaria.gob.es |
| Australia | 2002–2005 | ordinary_creator_income | 47% | top marginal 47% (2001-02 through 2005-06; threshold $60k) plus 1.5% Medicare levy; effective blend at high income | ato.gov.au |
| Australia | 2002–2005 | investment_returns | 24% | 50% CGT discount (in effect since Sept 1999) on the 47% top marginal plus Medicare levy; blended effective | ato.gov.au |
| Australia | 2006–2007 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | top marginal cut to 45% from 2006-07 (threshold raised to $150k) plus 1.5% Medicare levy; effective blend and continuous with the 2008 row | ato.gov.au |
| Australia | 2006–2007 | investment_returns | 24% | 50% CGT discount on the 2006-07 cut to 45% top marginal; blended effective and continuous with the 2008 row | ato.gov.au |
| India | 1973–1974 | ordinary_creator_income | 65% | headline top marginal plus surcharge reached 97.75% in FY1973-74 but was rarely realized at that level given agricultural-income exclusion, HUF income-splitting and PF/insurance exemptions; 0.65 is a defensible effective ceiling, not the headline | incometaxindia.gov.in |
| India | 1975–1984 | ordinary_creator_income | 55% | 1974-75 reform capped the top rate near 70% (about 75% with surcharge); effective still well under headline given the same exemption channels | incometaxindia.gov.in |
| India | 1985–1991 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | 1985-86 reform cut brackets from eight to four and the top marginal to 50%; effective blend closer to headline as base-broadening trimmed the exemption gap | incometaxindia.gov.in |
| India | 1992–1996 | ordinary_creator_income | 37% | 1992-93 liberalization reform cut the top marginal to 40% above Rs 1 lakh; effective blend at high income | incometaxindia.gov.in |
| India | 1997–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 30% | the 1997 budget cut the top marginal to 30% where it stayed nominally flat for 15 years; effective close to the flat headline at $1M+ income | incometaxindia.gov.in |
| India | 2013–2018 | ordinary_creator_income | 34% | a 10% surcharge on incomes above Rs 1 crore (2013-14) rose toward 15% by 2016-17 on top of the 30% base plus cess; effective blend at high income | incometaxindia.gov.in |
| India | 2019–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 42% | the 2019 budget's 37% surcharge on income above Rs 5 crore pushed the effective top rate to the widely cited 42.74% (30% base times 1.37 surcharge plus 4% cess); the 2023 new-regime option caps the surcharge at 25% instead | incometaxindia.gov.in |
| India | 1973–1991 | investment_returns | 30% | pre-1992 capital gains rules gave long-term holdings concessional treatment relative to the very high ordinary-income rates of the era; blended effective on a diversified portfolio | incometaxindia.gov.in |
| India | 1992–2003 | investment_returns | 20% | 1992 reform introduced indexed long-term capital gains at 20%; dividends were sheltered from the shareholder by dividend distribution tax charged at the company level instead | incometaxindia.gov.in |
| India | 2004–2017 | investment_returns | 5% | the Securities Transaction Tax regime from October 2004 made long-term gains on STT-paid listed equity fully exempt; dividends stayed DDT-sheltered at the company level; a listed-equity-heavy portfolio's blended effective fell close to zero | incometaxindia.gov.in |
| India | 2018–2026 | investment_returns | 14% | the 2018 budget reintroduced equity LTCG at 10% above a Rs 1 lakh exemption (12.5% without indexation from July 2024); DDT was abolished in 2020 so dividends are now taxed in the shareholder's hands at slab rates | incometaxindia.gov.in |
| Hong Kong | 1962–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 15% | salaries tax is capped by a standard rate that has held in a narrow 15-17% band for decades (two-tiered 15%/16% above HK$5 million from 2024-25); the standard rate is a hard ceiling so it doubles as the effective rate for top earners | gov.hk |
| Hong Kong | 1962–2026 | investment_returns | 1% | Hong Kong has no capital gains tax and no dividend or interest tax for an individual not carrying on a trade; profits tax only applies if gains are ruled to be trading income which is not the assumption here | gov.hk |
| CA-AB | 2015–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 46% | federal top bracket rose to 33% in 2016 and Alberta moved from a flat 10% to a progressive provincial scale topping out at 15% (over $355k); combined top about 48% with 2015 itself a lower transition year | taxsummaries.pwc.com |
| CA-AB | 2015–2026 | investment_returns | 23% | Canada includes only 50% of a capital gain in taxable income; a 2024 proposal to raise the inclusion rate to 66.67% was cancelled in March 2025 so it stayed at 50%; half of the about-48% combined top marginal applied to the taxable half | taxsummaries.pwc.com |
| IE | 2015–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 49% | income tax 40% plus USC up to 8% plus PRSI 4% combine to a top marginal near 52% for an employee; low band thresholds mean a $1M+ earner's effective sits close to that ceiling | taxsummaries.pwc.com |
| IE | 2015–2026 | investment_returns | 35% | CGT flat at 33% since December 2012 but Ireland gives dividends and interest no preferential rate so both are taxed at the roughly 52% marginal; blended effective on a 60/40 total return sits above the pure CGT rate | taxsummaries.pwc.com |
| NL | 2016–2020 | ordinary_creator_income | 51% | Box 1 employment and business income top rate held near 52% easing to 51.75% in 2020 on income above roughly EUR68k; effective blend at high income | taxsummaries.pwc.com |
| NL | 2021–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 48% | Box 1 top rate simplified down to 49.5% from 2021; effective blend at high income | taxsummaries.pwc.com |
| NL | 2016–2022 | investment_returns | 30% | Box 3 does not tax actual investment income; it taxes a deemed notional yield on net wealth at a flat rate (30% in this window rising to 31% by 2022) a mechanism with no direct equivalent elsewhere in this table | taxsummaries.pwc.com |
| NL | 2023–2026 | investment_returns | 34% | after the 2021 Supreme Court ruling that taxing unrealized deemed returns can violate property rights the Box 3 rate was pushed higher instead of abolished (32% in 2023 up to 36% by 2025-26) pending a full overhaul in 2028; still a deemed yield not actual gains | taxsummaries.pwc.com |
| BR | 2017–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 27% | personal progressive schedule tops out at 27.5% above a low monthly threshold; unlike Brazil-PJ's pessoa-juridica routing used by creators (about 20% effective) a club-salaried athlete has no PJ shelter and sits on the personal schedule | gov.br |
| BR | 2017–2026 | investment_returns | 17% | equity capital gains flat at 15%; other capital gains progressive 15-22.5% since the January 2017 reform; dividends from Brazilian companies remain tax-exempt to the individual shareholder; blended effective on a 60/40 total return | gov.br |
| RS | 2008–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 24% | flat 10% wage tax withheld at source plus a separate annual tax on aggregate income above 3x the average annual salary (10% up to 6x average; 15% above); a $1M+ earner clears the 6x threshold many times over | taxsummaries.pwc.com |
| RS | 2008–2026 | investment_returns | 15% | capital gains and dividends sit outside the wage-tax and annual-surtax aggregation and are taxed on their own flat schedule generally 15% | taxsummaries.pwc.com |
| CH | 2004–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 22% | assumes the documented canton of Schwyz (Wollerau/Freienbach), one of the lowest-tax communes in Switzerland at a combined federal, cantonal and communal top marginal near 19-23% versus roughly 40% in Zurich city; canton choice is the decisive variable here | taxsummaries.pwc.com |
| CH | 2004–2026 | investment_returns | 3% | private capital gains on movable assets are fully exempt at federal and cantonal level; the figure is not zero because dividends and bond interest within a blended portfolio remain taxable as ordinary income at the cantonal marginal rate | taxsummaries.pwc.com |
| JM | 2008–2016 | ordinary_creator_income | 25% | flat 25% PAYE marginal rate before the 2016-17 threshold reform; effective close to the flat headline at $1M+ income given the modest tax-free threshold of the era | taxsummaries.pwc.com |
| JM | 2017–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 29% | the 2016-17 reform paired a higher tax-free threshold with a new 30% top tier above J$6 million a year; a $1M+ USD earner is deep into that top band so effective sits close to 30% | taxsummaries.pwc.com |
| JM | 2008–2026 | investment_returns | 13% | Jamaica has no capital gains tax regime at all (only a 2% property transfer tax); dividends are withheld at a final 15% and bank interest at 25% which is what keeps the blended effective on a 60/40 total return well above zero | taxsummaries.pwc.com |
| US-MA | 2001–2002 | ordinary_creator_income | 44% | fed top 39.6% effective ~35% at high income plus MA 5.6% (2001) stepping to 5.3% (2002) | mass.gov |
| US-MA | 2003–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 39% | fed top 35% plus MA flat 5.3% (the final cut to 5.0% was delayed by the 2002 revenue act) | mass.gov |
| US-MA | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 44% | fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus MA 5.3% stepping to 5.1% | mass.gov |
| US-MA | 2018–2022 | ordinary_creator_income | 38% | fed top 37% effective ~33% at $1M+ plus MA 5.1% stepping to 5.0% | mass.gov |
| US-MA | 2023–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 42% | fed top 37% plus MA flat 5.0% plus the 4% Fair Share surtax on income over $1M, 9% combined at this earner's income level | mass.gov |
| US-MA | 2001–2012 | investment_returns | 20% | fed LTCG 15-20% plus MA taxing long-term gains like ordinary income at its flat 5.3-5.6% rate | mass.gov |
| US-MA | 2013–2022 | investment_returns | 27% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus MA ordinary treatment of long-term gains at its flat ~5.1% rate | mass.gov |
| US-MA | 2023–2026 | investment_returns | 33% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus MA 5.0% plus the 4% Fair Share surtax, which hits capital gains dollar for dollar with no separate threshold | mass.gov |
| US-LA | 2001–2002 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | fed top 39.6% effective ~35% plus LA's graduated 2/4/6% brackets (top 6%) discounted for LA's uncapped federal income tax deduction (repealed 2022) | revenue.louisiana.gov |
| US-LA | 2003–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 41% | fed top 35% plus LA top 6% net of the federal income tax deduction that shrank LA's taxable base for high earners | revenue.louisiana.gov |
| US-LA | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus LA top 6% net of the federal deduction | revenue.louisiana.gov |
| US-LA | 2018–2021 | ordinary_creator_income | 37% | fed top 37% plus LA top 6%, still net of the federal deduction which ran through 2021 | revenue.louisiana.gov |
| US-LA | 2022–2024 | ordinary_creator_income | 37% | fed top 37% plus LA's reformed 4.25% top bracket, now a straight add since the 2021 repeal of the federal income tax deduction was paired with the rate cut | revenue.louisiana.gov |
| US-LA | 2025–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 36% | fed top 37% plus LA's new flat 3% rate (graduated brackets repealed) | revenue.louisiana.gov |
| US-LA | 1997–2012 | investment_returns | 22% | fed LTCG 15-20% plus LA gains taxed as ordinary at its top 6% bracket net of the federal income tax deduction | revenue.louisiana.gov |
| US-LA | 2013–2021 | investment_returns | 28% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus LA ordinary treatment of gains at 6% net of the federal deduction | revenue.louisiana.gov |
| US-LA | 2022–2026 | investment_returns | 28% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus LA ordinary treatment of gains at its post-repeal 4.25% (2022-24) then flat 3% (2025-26) rate, no longer discounted by a federal deduction | revenue.louisiana.gov |
| US-SC | 1982–1986 | ordinary_creator_income | 53% | fed top 50% (ERTA) plus SC top 7% | dor.sc.gov |
| US-SC | 1987–1987 | ordinary_creator_income | 41% | TRA86 transition year fed top 38.5% plus SC top 7% | dor.sc.gov |
| US-SC | 1988–1992 | ordinary_creator_income | 35% | fed top 28-31% plus SC top 7% | dor.sc.gov |
| US-SC | 1993–2002 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | fed top 39.6% plus SC top 7% | dor.sc.gov |
| US-SC | 2003–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 40% | fed top 35% plus SC top 7% | dor.sc.gov |
| US-SC | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus SC top 7% | dor.sc.gov |
| US-SC | 2018–2021 | ordinary_creator_income | 40% | fed top 37% plus SC top 7% (last year before the 2022 rate-cut schedule began) | dor.sc.gov |
| US-SC | 2022–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 39% | fed top 37% plus SC's top bracket stepping down from 6.5% (2022) to 6.2%, then 6%, then a 5.21% two-bracket system by 2026 | dor.sc.gov |
| US-SC | 1982–1996 | investment_returns | 27% | fed LTCG 20-28% plus SC's 44% net capital gains exclusion against its 7% top bracket (56% of the gain is SC-taxable) | dor.sc.gov |
| US-SC | 1997–2012 | investment_returns | 20% | fed LTCG 15-20% plus SC's 44% exclusion against its 7% top bracket | dor.sc.gov |
| US-SC | 2013–2026 | investment_returns | 27% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus SC's 44% net capital gains exclusion against a top bracket stepping from 7% down to 6% | dor.sc.gov |
| US-CT | 1991–1992 | ordinary_creator_income | 32% | fed top 28-31% (OBRA90) plus CT's brand-new income tax: 1.5% in its first year (1991), stepping to a flat 4.5% (1992) | portal.ct.gov |
| US-CT | 1993–2002 | ordinary_creator_income | 44% | fed top 39.6% plus CT flat 4.5% | cga.ct.gov |
| US-CT | 2003–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 39% | fed top 35% plus CT's top rate, raised from 4.5% to 5% (2003) then to 6.7% (2011) | cga.ct.gov |
| US-CT | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus CT's top rate, 6.7% stepping to 6.99% (2015) | cga.ct.gov |
| US-CT | 2018–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 40% | fed top 37% plus CT top bracket 6.99% | cga.ct.gov |
| US-CT | 1991–1996 | investment_returns | 27% | fed LTCG 20-28% plus CT's transition from the old 7% capital gains tax (cut to 4.75% in August 1991) to the new unified income tax's flat 4.5% rate on all income | portal.ct.gov |
| US-CT | 1997–2012 | investment_returns | 23% | fed LTCG 15-20% plus CT's top rate under the unified income tax, 4.5% stepping to 5% (2003) then 6.7% (2011) | cga.ct.gov |
| US-CT | 2013–2026 | investment_returns | 29% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus CT ordinary treatment of gains at its top bracket, 6.7% stepping to 6.99% (2015) | cga.ct.gov |
| US-MT | 1982–1986 | ordinary_creator_income | 54% | fed top 50% plus MT top 11% | archive.legmt.gov |
| US-MT | 1987–1987 | ordinary_creator_income | 43% | TRA86 transition year fed top 38.5% plus MT top 11% | archive.legmt.gov |
| US-MT | 1988–1992 | ordinary_creator_income | 36% | fed top 28-31% plus MT top 11% | archive.legmt.gov |
| US-MT | 1993–2002 | ordinary_creator_income | 46% | fed top 39.6% plus MT top 11% | archive.legmt.gov |
| US-MT | 2003–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 40% | fed top 35% plus MT's post-reform top rate 6.9% (SB 407 collapsed the old bracket structure down from 11%) | archive.legmt.gov |
| US-MT | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus MT top 6.9% | archive.legmt.gov |
| US-MT | 2018–2023 | ordinary_creator_income | 40% | fed top 37% plus MT top 6.9% | archive.legmt.gov |
| US-MT | 2024–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 39% | fed top 37% plus MT's simplified two-bracket top rate, cut to 5.9% (2024-25) then 5.65% (2026) | archive.legmt.gov |
| US-MT | 1982–1996 | investment_returns | 29% | fed LTCG 20-28% plus MT's 11% top bracket applied to gains as ordinary income (pre-2003, before the capital gains credit existed) | montanabudget.org |
| US-MT | 1997–2012 | investment_returns | 21% | fed LTCG 15-20% plus MT's 11% bracket on gains through 2002, then a new 2% capital gains credit against the 6.9% rate from 2005 (net 4.9%) | montanabudget.org |
| US-MT | 2013–2026 | investment_returns | 27% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus MT's 2% capital gains credit against its top bracket, netting roughly 4.9% (6.9% top rate) down to about 3.7% (post-2024 top rate) | montanabudget.org |
| US-HI | 1986–1986 | ordinary_creator_income | 53% | fed top 50% (pre-TRA86, last year) plus HI top 8.25% | tfhawaii.org |
| US-HI | 1987–1987 | ordinary_creator_income | 42% | TRA86 transition year fed top 38.5% plus HI top 8.25% | tfhawaii.org |
| US-HI | 1988–1992 | ordinary_creator_income | 35% | fed top 28-31% plus HI top 8.25% | tfhawaii.org |
| US-HI | 1993–2002 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | fed top 39.6% plus HI top 8.25% | tfhawaii.org |
| US-HI | 2003–2008 | ordinary_creator_income | 40% | fed top 35% plus HI top 8.25% | tfhawaii.org |
| US-HI | 2009–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 41% | fed top 35% plus HI's temporary top bracket, raised to 11% for 2009-2015 by Act 60 | tfhawaii.org |
| US-HI | 2013–2015 | ordinary_creator_income | 46% | fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus HI's temporary 11% top bracket (expired end of 2015) | tfhawaii.org |
| US-HI | 2016–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus HI back to 8.25% after the temporary brackets expired | tfhawaii.org |
| US-HI | 2018–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 44% | fed top 37% plus HI's 11% top bracket, made permanent for tax years after 2017 | tax.hawaii.gov |
| US-HI | 1986–1996 | investment_returns | 28% | fed LTCG 20-28% plus HI's capital gains rate cap of 7.25%, materially below its ordinary top bracket throughout this period | hitaxfairness.org |
| US-HI | 1997–2012 | investment_returns | 21% | fed LTCG 15-20% plus HI's 7.25% capital gains cap | hitaxfairness.org |
| US-HI | 2013–2026 | investment_returns | 29% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus HI's 7.25% capital gains cap, unaffected by the ordinary-rate swings to 11% | hitaxfairness.org |
| US-CO | 1989–1992 | ordinary_creator_income | 34% | fed top 28-31% plus CO's flat tax, 5% since 1987 | content.leg.colorado.gov |
| US-CO | 1993–2002 | ordinary_creator_income | 44% | fed top 39.6% plus CO's flat rate, 5% through 1998 then 4.75% (1999) and 4.63% (2000-02) | content.leg.colorado.gov |
| US-CO | 2003–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 39% | fed top 35% plus CO flat 4.63% | content.leg.colorado.gov |
| US-CO | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 44% | fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus CO flat 4.63% | content.leg.colorado.gov |
| US-CO | 2018–2021 | ordinary_creator_income | 38% | fed top 37% plus CO's flat rate, 4.63% cut to 4.55% by Proposition 116 (2020) | content.leg.colorado.gov |
| US-CO | 2022–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 37% | fed top 37% plus CO's flat rate cut to 4.40% by Proposition 121 (2022) | content.leg.colorado.gov |
| US-CO | 1989–1996 | investment_returns | 27% | fed LTCG 20-28% plus CO's flat 5% rate applied to gains as ordinary income | content.leg.colorado.gov |
| US-CO | 1997–2012 | investment_returns | 20% | fed LTCG 15-20% plus CO's flat rate, 5% stepping down to 4.63% by 2000, applied to gains as ordinary income | content.leg.colorado.gov |
| US-CO | 2013–2026 | investment_returns | 27% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus CO's flat rate, 4.63% stepping down to 4.40%, applied to gains as ordinary income | content.leg.colorado.gov |
| US-WI | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus WI top bracket 7.65% | revenue.wi.gov |
| US-WI | 2018–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 41% | fed top 37% plus WI top bracket 7.65% (unchanged since the 2013 cut from 7.75%) | revenue.wi.gov |
| US-WI | 2013–2026 | investment_returns | 28% | fed 20% (NIIT 3.8% from 2013) plus WI's 30% long-term capital gains exclusion applied against its 7.65% top bracket, so 70% of the gain is WI-taxable | revenue.wi.gov |
| US-AZ | 2007–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 39% | fed top 35% plus AZ top bracket 4.54% (in place since a 2006 rate cut) | taxfoundation.org |
| US-AZ | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 44% | fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus AZ top 4.54% | taxfoundation.org |
| US-AZ | 2018–2022 | ordinary_creator_income | 38% | fed top 37% plus AZ top 4.54%; Prop 208's 3.5% surcharge notionally began 2021 but was capped then struck down by the AZ Supreme Court in August 2022, so top earners paid little more than the base rate | taxfoundation.org |
| US-AZ | 2023–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 36% | fed top 37% plus AZ's new flat 2.5% rate, replacing the old graduated brackets | taxfoundation.org |
| US-AZ | 2007–2012 | investment_returns | 20% | fed LTCG 15-20% plus AZ gains taxed as ordinary income at its 4.54% top bracket | taxfoundation.org |
| US-AZ | 2013–2022 | investment_returns | 27% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus AZ ordinary treatment of gains at its 4.54% top bracket | taxfoundation.org |
| US-AZ | 2023–2026 | investment_returns | 26% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus AZ's flat 2.5% rate applied to gains as ordinary income | taxfoundation.org |
| US-MO | 2018–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 38% | fed top 37% effective ~33% at $1M+ plus MO's top bracket on its post-2018 glide path, 5.9% (2018) down to 4.7% (2025-26) | dor.mo.gov |
| US-MO | 2018–2024 | investment_returns | 29% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus MO gains taxed as ordinary income on the same glide path down to 4.8% | dor.mo.gov |
| US-MO | 2025–2026 | investment_returns | 24% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% only, since HB 594 (2025) made Missouri the first state to fully exempt individual capital gains from its income tax | dor.mo.gov |
| US-KS | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 44% | fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus KS's top rate, cut to 4.9% (2013-14) then frozen at 4.6% (2015-17) | ksrevenue.gov |
| US-KS | 2018–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 39% | fed top 37% plus KS's top rate, restored to 5.7% in 2017, then cut to 5.58% by the 2024 reform | ksrevenue.gov |
| US-KS | 2013–2026 | investment_returns | 28% | fed blend of 15-20% LTCG plus NIIT from 2013 plus KS gains taxed as ordinary income across the same 4.6-5.7% rate history | ksrevenue.gov |
| US-GA | 1992–1992 | ordinary_creator_income | 34% | fed top 28-31% (last year of this bracket) plus GA's longstanding top bracket 6% | dor.georgia.gov |
| US-GA | 1993–2002 | ordinary_creator_income | 44% | fed top 39.6% plus GA top 6% | dor.georgia.gov |
| US-GA | 2003–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 39% | fed top 35% plus GA top 6% | dor.georgia.gov |
| US-GA | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 44% | fed top 39.6% plus ACA surtaxes plus GA top 6% | dor.georgia.gov |
| US-GA | 2018–2020 | ordinary_creator_income | 39% | fed top 37% plus GA's top rate, 6% in 2018 then cut to 5.75% by HB 918 from 2019 | dor.georgia.gov |
| US-GA | 1992–1996 | investment_returns | 27% | fed LTCG 20-28% plus GA gains taxed as ordinary income at its 6% top bracket (no exclusion) | dor.georgia.gov |
| US-GA | 1997–2012 | investment_returns | 20% | fed LTCG 15-20% plus GA ordinary treatment of gains at 6% | dor.georgia.gov |
| US-GA | 2013–2026 | investment_returns | 28% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus GA ordinary treatment of gains across its 6% (2013-18), 5.75% (2019-20), and flat-tax glide down to 5.19% (2021-26) rates | dor.georgia.gov |
| US-OH | 2013–2026 | investment_returns | 27% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus OH gains taxed as ordinary nonbusiness income across its top-bracket glide path, 4.797% (pre-2021) then 3.99%, 3.5% from 2024 | tax.ohio.gov |
| US-NC | 2012–2017 | investment_returns | 20% | fed LTCG 15-20% plus NC gains taxed as ordinary income at its flat rate stepping from 5.75% to 5.499% | ncdor.gov |
| US-NC | 2018–2026 | investment_returns | 27% | fed 20% + NIIT 3.8% plus NC ordinary treatment of gains across its flat-rate glide path, 5.25% stepping down toward 3.99% by 2026 | ncdor.gov |
| US-PR | 2021–2026 | investment_returns | 18% | Act 60 gives qualifying bona fide PR residents 0% on PR-source capital gains accrued after their move date; built-in gains from before the move stay federally taxable, so this blends full federal treatment on the pre-move and mainland-source share with 0% on the qualifying post-move share | hklaw.com |
| CA-BC | 2015–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 50% | federal top bracket 33% plus British Columbia's top provincial rate of 20.5% over $265,545 (2026 BC schedule) gives a combined top marginal near 53.5%, above Alberta's 48%; effective rate at high income taken just under the marginal, on the same basis as the CA-AB row | www2.gov.bc.ca |
| CA-BC | 2015–2026 | investment_returns | 27% | Canada includes only 50% of a capital gain in taxable income; the 2024 proposal to raise the inclusion rate to 66.67% was cancelled in March 2025 so it stayed at 50%; half of the about-53.5% BC combined top marginal applied to the taxable half | www2.gov.bc.ca |
| US-NC | 1996–2002 | ordinary_creator_income | 50% | NC top bracket about 7.75% before the 2014 flat-tax reform; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | ncdor.gov |
| US-NC | 2003–2011 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | NC top bracket about 7.75% before the 2014 flat-tax reform; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | ncdor.gov |
| US-NC | 1996–1996 | investment_returns | 33% | NC top bracket about 7.75% before the 2014 flat-tax reform; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | ncdor.gov |
| US-NC | 1997–2011 | investment_returns | 26% | NC top bracket about 7.75% before the 2014 flat-tax reform; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | ncdor.gov |
| US-AZ | 1984–1986 | ordinary_creator_income | 46% | AZ graduated top bracket about 5.5% in this era; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | azdor.gov |
| US-AZ | 1987–1987 | ordinary_creator_income | 41% | AZ graduated top bracket about 5.5% in this era; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | azdor.gov |
| US-AZ | 1988–1992 | ordinary_creator_income | 35% | AZ graduated top bracket about 5.5% in this era; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | azdor.gov |
| US-AZ | 1993–2002 | ordinary_creator_income | 47% | AZ graduated top bracket about 5.5% in this era; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | azdor.gov |
| US-AZ | 2003–2006 | ordinary_creator_income | 42% | AZ graduated top bracket about 5.5% in this era; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | azdor.gov |
| US-AZ | 1984–1996 | investment_returns | 30% | AZ graduated top bracket about 5.5% in this era; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | azdor.gov |
| US-AZ | 1997–2006 | investment_returns | 23% | AZ graduated top bracket about 5.5% in this era; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | azdor.gov |
| US-SC | 1975–1981 | ordinary_creator_income | 47% | SC top bracket 7%; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | dor.sc.gov |
| US-SC | 1975–1981 | investment_returns | 36% | SC top bracket 7%; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | dor.sc.gov |
| US-MT | 1975–1981 | ordinary_creator_income | 51% | MT top bracket 11% in this era; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | mtrevenue.gov |
| US-MT | 1975–1981 | investment_returns | 40% | MT top bracket 11% in this era; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | mtrevenue.gov |
| US-IL | 1986–1986 | ordinary_creator_income | 43% | IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.illinois.gov |
| US-IL | 1987–1987 | ordinary_creator_income | 39% | IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.illinois.gov |
| US-IL | 1988–1988 | ordinary_creator_income | 33% | IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.illinois.gov |
| US-IL | 1989–1992 | ordinary_creator_income | 33% | IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.illinois.gov |
| US-IL | 1993–2002 | ordinary_creator_income | 45% | IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.illinois.gov |
| US-IL | 2003–2010 | ordinary_creator_income | 40% | IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.illinois.gov |
| US-IL | 2011–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 42% | IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.illinois.gov |
| US-IL | 2013–2014 | ordinary_creator_income | 47% | IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.illinois.gov |
| US-IL | 2015–2016 | ordinary_creator_income | 46% | IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.illinois.gov |
| US-IL | 2017–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 47% | IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.illinois.gov |
| US-IL | 2018–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 38% | IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.illinois.gov |
| US-IL | 1986–1988 | investment_returns | 28% | IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | tax.illinois.gov |
| US-IL | 1989–1996 | investment_returns | 28% | IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | tax.illinois.gov |
| US-IL | 1997–2010 | investment_returns | 21% | IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | tax.illinois.gov |
| US-IL | 2011–2012 | investment_returns | 23% | IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | tax.illinois.gov |
| US-IL | 2013–2014 | investment_returns | 29% | IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | tax.illinois.gov |
| US-IL | 2015–2016 | investment_returns | 28% | IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | tax.illinois.gov |
| US-IL | 2017–2026 | investment_returns | 29% | IL flat rate, 2.5% then 3%, 5%, 3.75%, and 4.95% from 2017; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | tax.illinois.gov |
| US-NM | 2008–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 42% | NM top bracket 4.9% then 5.9% from 2021; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.newmexico.gov |
| US-NM | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 47% | NM top bracket 4.9% then 5.9% from 2021; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.newmexico.gov |
| US-NM | 2018–2020 | ordinary_creator_income | 38% | NM top bracket 4.9% then 5.9% from 2021; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.newmexico.gov |
| US-NM | 2021–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 39% | NM top bracket 4.9% then 5.9% from 2021; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.newmexico.gov |
| US-NM | 2008–2012 | investment_returns | 23% | NM top bracket 4.9% then 5.9% from 2021; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | tax.newmexico.gov |
| US-NM | 2013–2020 | investment_returns | 29% | NM top bracket 4.9% then 5.9% from 2021; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | tax.newmexico.gov |
| US-NM | 2021–2026 | investment_returns | 30% | NM top bracket 4.9% then 5.9% from 2021; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | tax.newmexico.gov |
| US-VA | 2001–2002 | ordinary_creator_income | 48% | VA top bracket 5.75%; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.virginia.gov |
| US-VA | 2003–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 43% | VA top bracket 5.75%; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.virginia.gov |
| US-VA | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 48% | VA top bracket 5.75%; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.virginia.gov |
| US-VA | 2018–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 39% | VA top bracket 5.75%; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | tax.virginia.gov |
| US-VA | 2001–2012 | investment_returns | 24% | VA top bracket 5.75%; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | tax.virginia.gov |
| US-VA | 2013–2026 | investment_returns | 30% | VA top bracket 5.75%; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | tax.virginia.gov |
| US-OR | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 52% | OR top bracket 9.9%, among the highest state rates; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | oregon.gov |
| US-OR | 2018–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 43% | OR top bracket 9.9%, among the highest state rates; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | oregon.gov |
| US-OR | 2013–2026 | investment_returns | 34% | OR top bracket 9.9%, among the highest state rates; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | oregon.gov |
| US-NE | 2008–2012 | ordinary_creator_income | 44% | NE top bracket 6.84% easing to 5.8%; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | revenue.nebraska.gov |
| US-NE | 2013–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 49% | NE top bracket 6.84% easing to 5.8%; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | revenue.nebraska.gov |
| US-NE | 2018–2022 | ordinary_creator_income | 40% | NE top bracket 6.84% easing to 5.8%; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | revenue.nebraska.gov |
| US-NE | 2023–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 39% | NE top bracket 6.84% easing to 5.8%; federal effective blend plus the state top rate | revenue.nebraska.gov |
| US-NE | 2008–2012 | investment_returns | 25% | NE top bracket 6.84% easing to 5.8%; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | revenue.nebraska.gov |
| US-NE | 2013–2022 | investment_returns | 31% | NE top bracket 6.84% easing to 5.8%; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | revenue.nebraska.gov |
| US-NE | 2023–2026 | investment_returns | 30% | NE top bracket 6.84% easing to 5.8%; gains taxed as ordinary income at the state rate | revenue.nebraska.gov |
| Monaco | 1970–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 1% | Monaco levies no personal income tax on residents (French nationals excepted); residents keep employment and endorsement income untaxed locally | en.service-public.mc |
| Monaco | 1970–2026 | investment_returns | 1% | Monaco has no personal income tax and no capital gains tax for residents; near zero on a private portfolio | en.service-public.mc |
| Italy | 2004–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 43% | Italy top national rate 43% plus regional and municipal surcharges, roughly 45-48% at high income; the flat-tax regime for new residents can lower the effective rate on foreign income, so this is a conservative salary-rate blend | agenziaentrate.gov.it |
| Italy | 2004–2026 | investment_returns | 26% | Italy taxes financial income at a 26% substitute rate on most capital gains and dividends | agenziaentrate.gov.it |
| PH | 1995–2017 | ordinary_creator_income | 30% | Philippines top marginal 32-35% in this era; effective around 30% at high income after the graduated schedule | bir.gov.ph |
| PH | 2018–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 32% | Philippines TRAIN law top rate 35% from 2018; effective around 32% at high income | bir.gov.ph |
| PH | 1995–2026 | investment_returns | 13% | Philippines taxes listed-share gains at a small percentage tax and other capital gains at 6-15%, with a 10% dividend tax; blended low effective | bir.gov.ph |
| SA | 2009–2026 | ordinary_creator_income | 1% | Saudi Arabia levies no individual income tax on employment income; a resident athlete's salary is untaxed locally | zatca.gov.sa |
| SA | 2009–2026 | investment_returns | 1% | Saudi Arabia has no personal capital gains dividend or interest tax on an individual's own portfolio | zatca.gov.sa |
| Brazil-PJ | 2001–2014 | ordinary_creator_income | 20% | Brazilian income routed through a pessoa-juridica company is taxed near 20% effective via Simples or Lucro Presumido, well below the 27.5% personal top rate | gov.br |
| Brazil-PJ | 2001–2026 | investment_returns | 15% | Brazil taxes equity capital gains at a flat 15% while dividends to the individual shareholder are exempt; blended low effective | gov.br |
| US-CT | 1952–1990 | ordinary_creator_income | 42% | Connecticut had no broad income tax until 1991, so these years are federal-only effective at high income | portal.ct.gov |
| US-CT | 1952–1990 | investment_returns | 27% | Connecticut had no broad income tax before 1991; a narrow capital-gains and dividends tax applied from 1969, blended into a federal-mostly effective | portal.ct.gov |
| CA-BC | 2008–2014 | ordinary_creator_income | 44% | British Columbia combined federal and provincial top rate about 44% before the 2016 federal top-bracket rise | www2.gov.bc.ca |
| CA-BC | 2008–2014 | investment_returns | 22% | Canada includes only 50% of a capital gain in income; half of the about-44% pre-2016 BC combined top rate | www2.gov.bc.ca |
| After-tax income bracket | Saved | Study | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| middle_quintile | 11% | Dynan Skinner Zeldes 2004 JPE (SCF-based median saving rates rise with income) | piketty.pse.ens.fr |
| top_quintile | 24% | Dynan Skinner Zeldes 2004 JPE | piketty.pse.ens.fr |
| top_5_percent | 37% | Dynan Skinner Zeldes 2004 JPE | piketty.pse.ens.fr |
| top_1_percent | 51% | Dynan Skinner Zeldes 2004 JPE | piketty.pse.ens.fr |
| above_2M_extrapolated | 65% | extrapolation beyond DSZ top 1% following monotonic income-savings trend; assumption disclosed | extrapolation |
| Year | S&P 500 TR | US Agg bonds | 60/40 blend | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1984 | +6.3% | +15.2% | +9.8% | slickcharts.com |
| 1985 | +31.7% | +22.1% | +27.9% | slickcharts.com |
| 1986 | +18.7% | +15.3% | +17.3% | slickcharts.com |
| 1987 | +5.2% | +2.8% | +4.2% | slickcharts.com |
| 1988 | +16.6% | +7.9% | +13.1% | slickcharts.com |
| 1989 | +31.7% | +14.5% | +24.8% | slickcharts.com |
| 1990 | -3.1% | +9.0% | +1.7% | slickcharts.com |
| 1991 | +30.5% | +16.0% | +24.7% | slickcharts.com |
| 1992 | +7.6% | +7.4% | +7.5% | slickcharts.com |
| 1993 | +10.1% | +9.8% | +10.0% | slickcharts.com |
| 1994 | +1.3% | -2.9% | -0.4% | slickcharts.com |
| 1995 | +37.6% | +18.5% | +29.9% | slickcharts.com |
| 1996 | +23.0% | +3.6% | +15.2% | slickcharts.com |
| 1997 | +33.4% | +9.7% | +23.9% | slickcharts.com |
| 1998 | +28.6% | +8.7% | +20.6% | slickcharts.com |
| 1999 | +21.0% | -0.8% | +12.3% | slickcharts.com |
| 2000 | -9.1% | +11.6% | -0.8% | slickcharts.com |
| 2001 | -11.9% | +8.4% | -3.8% | slickcharts.com |
| 2002 | -22.1% | +10.2% | -9.2% | slickcharts.com |
| 2003 | +28.7% | +4.1% | +18.9% | slickcharts.com |
| 2004 | +10.9% | +4.3% | +8.3% | slickcharts.com |
| 2005 | +4.9% | +2.4% | +3.9% | slickcharts.com |
| 2006 | +15.8% | +4.3% | +11.2% | slickcharts.com |
| 2007 | +5.5% | +7.0% | +6.1% | slickcharts.com |
| 2008 | -37.0% | +5.2% | -20.1% | slickcharts.com |
| 2009 | +26.5% | +5.9% | +18.2% | slickcharts.com |
| 2010 | +15.1% | +6.5% | +11.7% | slickcharts.com |
| 2011 | +2.1% | +7.8% | +4.4% | slickcharts.com |
| 2012 | +16.0% | +4.2% | +11.3% | slickcharts.com |
| 2013 | +32.4% | -2.0% | +18.6% | slickcharts.com |
| 2014 | +13.7% | +6.0% | +10.6% | slickcharts.com |
| 2015 | +1.4% | +0.5% | +1.1% | slickcharts.com |
| 2016 | +12.0% | +2.6% | +8.2% | slickcharts.com |
| 2017 | +21.8% | +3.5% | +14.5% | slickcharts.com |
| 2018 | -4.4% | +0.0% | -2.6% | slickcharts.com |
| 2019 | +31.5% | +8.7% | +22.4% | slickcharts.com |
| 2020 | +18.4% | +7.5% | +14.0% | slickcharts.com |
| 2021 | +28.7% | -1.5% | +16.6% | slickcharts.com |
| 2022 | -18.1% | -13.0% | -16.1% | slickcharts.com |
| 2023 | +26.3% | +5.5% | +18.0% | slickcharts.com |
| 2024 | +25.0% | +1.2% | +15.5% | slickcharts.com |
| 2025 | +17.9% | +7.3% | +13.7% | rbcwealthmanagement.com |
| 2026 | +0.0% | +0.0% | +0.0% | slickcharts.com |
| Business type | Comp | Year | Multiple | Notes | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| newsletter_media | Morning Brew / Insider majority | 2020 | 3.75x | $75M valuation on ~$20M 2020 revenue; majority all-cash | axios.com |
| newsletter_media | The Hustle / HubSpot | 2021 | 2.5x | reported ~$27M ($17.2M net per HubSpot 10-K) on est ~$10M+ revenue | sec.gov |
| creator_media_network | Theorist Media / Lunar X | 2022 | 3.0x | undisclosed; industry estimates $40-60M; our derived ~3x on ~$9M revenue | tubefilter.com |
| auction_marketplace | Cars & Bids / The Chernin Group majority | 2023 | 6.0x | $37M for majority implies ~$62M on est ~$10M annual commission revenue | tubefilter.com |
| creator_brand_platform | Dude Perfect / Highmount growth round | 2024 | 4.0x | $100-300M committed; company-stated revenue >$50M; minority growth capital | axios.com |
| subscription_box | BARK (BarkBox) SPAC | 2021 | 4.4x | $1.6B on $365M FY21 revenue at SPAC peak; later compressed to ~0.5-1x in public trading (use compressed end for private sub-box) | retaildive.com |
| auction_marketplace | Cars & Bids combined entity (per Doug DeMuro on My First Million #456 title) | 2023 | n/ax | podcast title states company sold for $80M; corroborates our $61.7M implied floor | linkedin.com |
| Platform | Year | Per stream | Basis | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| spotify | 2024 | $0.0035 | aggregate $0.003-0.005 per stream to rights holders (midpoint low); premium higher than ad-tier | chartlex.com |
| spotify | 2024 | $0.7000 | structural: 70% of revenue to rights holders (70/30 split); 1000-stream royalty floor since Apr 2024 (row = share not per-stream) | artists.spotify.com |
| apple_music | 2021 | $0.0100 | Apple artist letter: averages one penny per stream (as reported; verify URL) | wsj.com |
| distrokid_distribution | 2026 | $1.0000 | self-released via flat-fee distributor keeps 100% of royalties (annual fee ~$25); engine uses 0.85 artist share after typical producer/collaborator splits (assumption) | distrokid.com |
| label_deal_artist_share | 2026 | $0.2000 | typical major-label artist royalty 15-25% of receipts (midpoint); PENDING SOURCE | assumption |
Lanes without direct measurement are estimated rather than zeroed. Merchandise uses sourced print-on-demand benchmarks: 0.5% of engaged fans buying one drop a year at a $25 order, at sourced margins. Streaming royalties beyond Spotify are estimated by scaling the measured Spotify royalties to the whole market, since Spotify holds 32.2% of global music subscribers. Shorts views from before YouTube switched on revenue sharing are priced at the Fund-era floor rate. Channel memberships are estimated wherever a channel has them enabled. Instagram and TikTok brand posts are estimated from a channel’s reach at sourced per-post rates, six paid posts a year, capped at 30% of its YouTube revenue. The benchmark table below publishes every one of these rates with its source, and rows marked as assumptions say so. Real estate enters where a purchase is on record and appreciates at its metro Case-Shiller rate, and a business stake enters where a real transaction fixes its value. Art collections are the remaining lane we are building out.
All 23 actor pages run on the same discipline. A film role earns one of three things. A disclosed salary and documented backend, entered as reported with a citation. For undisclosed lead roles after an actor’s breakthrough, the median of disclosed salaries for that era and budget band, capped at 15% of the film’s budget, the largest share ever reliably reported. And for supporting roles and roles before the breakthrough, a documented fraction of that same median: across the eleven disclosed deals in our table signed by actors who were not yet stars, from Stallone’s $35,000 for Rocky to DiCaprio’s $2.5M upfront for Titanic, the median deal paid about 3% of its era’s going lead rate, so undisclosed supporting and early roles are modeled at that ratio. Films with no reported budget are treated as small productions. Every role is estimated; a role would only enter at zero if someone documented that it was played for free. Backend percentages are never assumed. Documented non-film income enters as dated rows with citations: Friends salaries season by season, Tulsa King at its reported per-episode fees, a Dior partnership at its reported minimum. Representation fees, taxes by era, the savings curve, and real benchmark returns then run exactly as they do for creators, with one addition: where court filings document actual spending, the filings replace the curve.
Three more lanes are estimated rather than zeroed. Undocumented backend enters as an expected value: across our disclosed lead deals, about 15% included points, at a median 2.3% of box office, so undisclosed post-breakthrough lead roles carry that expected value against their box office, and films whose points are documented but unquantified carry the median rate directly. Endorsements enter as the number of brand partnerships times a per-brand annual fee and term. For film actors that fee is the median disclosed ambassador deal in the endorsement table below. Athletes and creators use a modeled per-brand rate, because the endorsement deals reported for them are almost all megastar outliers, and anyone whose own deal is public enters at that reported figure. Producer, director, and writer credits enter at a union-scale floor per credit, scaled to each era. Residuals are estimated from SAG residual rates applied to assumed post-theatrical receipts, split by role and spread over the decade after release. Named TV runs, Broadway engagements, and art sales enter through cited per-person rows. Real estate enters where a purchase is documented and appreciates at its metro rate, and a business stake enters where a real transaction fixes its value; art collections are the remaining lane we are building out.
Multi-decade careers forced two accumulation rules the creator pages never needed. First, the savings rate is capped at 51%, the top bracket the Dynan–Skinner–Zeldes study actually measured; the higher figure in our table is a disclosed extrapolation, and compounding an extrapolation across 40 years would let one assumption dominate the page. Second, portfolio returns are taxed at sourced capital-gains blends for each era before they compound, because untaxed compounding roughly doubled the oldest careers against every known reference point. Documented one-off liabilities also enter with citations, like the reported $90 million Willis–Moore divorce settlement. UK-filed companies are checked against the register exactly as on creator pages: Jason Statham’s and Emma Watson’s production companies file publicly, and both sit far below the model, which the pages report as documented floors rather than additions.
The Depp pilot doubles as a backtest. His former managers’ court records put his 2003–2016 earnings near $650 million. The model, built only from film pay, lands under that court-documented total for the same window, and his page reports the exact share along with which zero-counted lanes hold the rest. A floor that lands under a court-documented total, for documented reasons, is the model behaving.
| Actor | Film | Year | Pay | What was disclosed | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dustin Hoffman | Tootsie | 1982 | $5,500,000 upfront | reported $5.5M, the salary that reset the top of the market at a time when top salaries ran $2-3M | screenrant.com (aggregator) |
| Bruce Willis | Die Hard | 1988 | $5,000,000 upfront | reported $5M, controversial at the time as TV-star money matching established film leads | screenrant.com (aggregator) |
| Jim Carrey | The Cable Guy | 1996 | $20,000,000 upfront | first $20M upfront comedy salary plus 15% backend (backend amount not separately reported) | variety.com (trade press) |
| Leonardo DiCaprio | Titanic | 1997 | $2,500,000 upfront, $37,500,000 backend | $2.5M upfront (pre-stardom casting) plus negotiated 1.8% of gross; total widely reported ~$40M as the film passed $2B | yahoo.com (press) |
| Julia Roberts | Erin Brockovich | 2000 | $20,000,000 upfront | first $20M salary for an actress, widely covered milestone | history.com (press) |
| Leonardo DiCaprio | The Beach | 2000 | $20,000,000 upfront | post-Titanic $20M quote, widely reported | yahoo.com (press) |
| Johnny Depp | Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of the Black Pearl | 2003 | $10,000,000 upfront | reported $10M for the first film | screenrant.com (aggregator) |
| Sandra Bullock | Miss Congeniality 2: Armed and Fabulous | 2005 | $17,500,000 upfront | reported $17.5M | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Johnny Depp | Pirates of the Caribbean: Dead Man's Chest | 2006 | $20,000,000 upfront, $40,000,000 backend | $20M base with backend taking the film's total to a reported $60M | screenrant.com (aggregator) |
| Johnny Depp | Pirates of the Caribbean: At World's End | 2007 | $50,000,000 total | reported $50M total for the third film (upfront/backend split not reported) | screenrant.com (aggregator) |
| Sandra Bullock | The Blind Side | 2009 | $20,000,000 upfront | reported ~$20M with backend participation on top (backend not separately quantified) | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Johnny Depp | Alice in Wonderland | 2010 | $50,000,000 total | reported ~$50M total, heavily backend-weighted | faroutmagazine.co.uk (aggregator) |
| Johnny Depp | Pirates of the Caribbean: On Stranger Tides | 2011 | $35,000,000 upfront, $20,000,000 backend | $35M base plus $20M in bonuses, reported ~14.5% of the film's record budget | screenrant.com (aggregator) |
| Sandra Bullock | Gravity | 2013 | $20,000,000 upfront, $50,000,000 backend | THR exclusive: $20M upfront against 15% of first-dollar gross; total reported at least $70M across streams | hollywoodreporter.com (trade press) |
| Leonardo DiCaprio | The Revenant | 2015 | $20,000,000 upfront | reported $20M | therichest.com (aggregator) |
| Jennifer Lawrence | Passengers | 2016 | $20,000,000 upfront | reported $20M, widely covered at the time | indiewire.com (trade press) |
| Johnny Depp | Pirates of the Caribbean: Dead Men Tell No Tales | 2017 | $90,000,000 total | reported ~$90M total for the fifth film incl. backend | screenrant.com (aggregator) |
| Robert Downey Jr. | Avengers: Endgame | 2019 | $20,000,000 upfront, $55,000,000 backend | Forbes: $20M upfront plus ~$55M backend from an 8% first-dollar-type deal, $75M total | indiewire.com (trade press) |
| Leonardo DiCaprio | Don't Look Up | 2021 | $30,000,000 upfront | Variety: $30M streaming salary (Lawrence $25M on the same film) | variety.com (trade press) |
| Jennifer Lawrence | Don't Look Up | 2021 | $25,000,000 upfront | Variety: $25M streaming salary | variety.com (trade press) |
| Leonardo DiCaprio | Killers of the Flower Moon | 2023 | $30,000,000 upfront | reported $30M (some later reports put it at $40M; earlier trade figure used and the range is noted) | screenrant.com (aggregator) |
| Leonardo DiCaprio | One Battle After Another | 2025 | $20,000,000 upfront | reported $20M for the Paul Thomas Anderson film | variety.com (trade press) |
| Sandra Bullock | Speed | 1994 | $500,000 upfront | reported $500k, pre-stardom casting | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Sandra Bullock | Speed 2: Cruise Control | 1997 | $10,500,000 upfront | reported $10.5M | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Scarlett Johansson | Black Widow | 2021 | $20,000,000 upfront | Disney's public response to her release-window lawsuit confirmed a $20M salary | variety.com (first-party statement) |
| Scarlett Johansson | Avengers: Infinity War | 2018 | $15,000,000 upfront | reported $15M for each of the last two Avengers films | screenrant.com (aggregator) |
| Scarlett Johansson | Avengers: Endgame | 2019 | $15,000,000 upfront, $20,000,000 backend | reported $15M upfront, around $35M once bonuses landed | cinemablend.com (press) |
| Scarlett Johansson | Ghost in the Shell | 2017 | $17,500,000 upfront | reported $17.5M, her career-high upfront at the time | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Margot Robbie | Barbie | 2023 | $12,500,000 upfront, $37,500,000 backend | Variety: $12.5M salary with box office bonuses taking the total to roughly $50M | variety.com (trade press) |
| Emma Watson | Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows - PT1 | 2010 | $15,000,000 upfront | reported $30M combined for the two final films | screenrant.com (aggregator) |
| Emma Watson | Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows - PT2 | 2011 | $15,000,000 upfront | reported $30M combined for the two final films | screenrant.com (aggregator) |
| Emma Watson | Beauty and the Beast | 2017 | $3,000,000 upfront, $12,000,000 backend | THR: $3M upfront, escalating to $15M on Maleficent-level box office, which it hit | hollywoodreporter.com (trade press) |
| Tom Hanks | Forrest Gump | 1994 | $62,500,000 backend | took gross points instead of a salary; Entertainment Weekly put the return at $60M, IndieWire at $65M, midpoint booked | indiewire.com (trade press) |
| Tom Hanks | Saving Private Ryan | 1998 | $37,500,000 total | reported $30-40M from fee plus backend, midpoint booked | en.wikipedia.org (aggregator) |
| Tom Hanks | Toy Story | 1995 | $50,000 upfront | reported $50K voice fee, per the Los Angeles Times | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Julia Roberts | Steel Magnolias | 1989 | $90,000 upfront | reported $90K, per the Los Angeles Times | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Julia Roberts | Pretty Woman | 1990 | $300,000 upfront | reported $300K, per the Los Angeles Times; pre-stardom casting | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Julia Roberts | Flatliners | 1990 | $550,000 upfront | reported $550K, per the Los Angeles Times | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Julia Roberts | Sleeping with the Enemy | 1991 | $1,000,000 upfront | reported $1M, per the Los Angeles Times; contracted before Pretty Woman opened | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Julia Roberts | Mona Lisa Smile | 2003 | $25,000,000 upfront | reported $25M, then the record salary for an actress | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Julia Roberts | Valentine's Day | 2010 | $3,000,000 upfront | reported $3M for six minutes of screen time, per Variety | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Julia Roberts | Mother's Day | 2016 | $3,000,000 upfront | reported $3M, per Variety | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Bruce Willis | The Sixth Sense | 1999 | $14,000,000 upfront, $86,000,000 backend | $14M fee plus 17.5% of profits; total reported around $100M | cheatsheet.com (press) |
| Angelina Jolie | Lara Croft: Tomb Raider | 2001 | $7,000,000 upfront | reported $7M | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Angelina Jolie | Lara Croft: Tomb Raider, Cradle of Life | 2003 | $12,000,000 upfront | reported $12M | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Angelina Jolie | Mr. & Mrs. Smith | 2005 | $10,000,000 upfront | reported $10M | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Angelina Jolie | Wanted | 2008 | $15,000,000 upfront | reported $15M | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Angelina Jolie | Salt | 2010 | $20,000,000 upfront | reported $20M plus a percentage of gross | filmindustry.network (aggregator) |
| Angelina Jolie | The Tourist | 2010 | $19,000,000 upfront | reported $19M | filmindustry.network (aggregator) |
| Matt Damon | The Bourne Identity | 2002 | $10,000,000 upfront | reported $10M | etonline.com (press) |
| Matt Damon | The Bourne Supremacy | 2004 | $26,000,000 upfront | reported $26M | etonline.com (press) |
| Matt Damon | The Bourne Ultimatum | 2007 | $26,000,000 upfront | reported $26M | etonline.com (press) |
| Matt Damon | The Martian | 2015 | $25,000,000 upfront | reported $25M | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Matt Damon | Jason Bourne | 2016 | $25,000,000 upfront | reported $25M | etonline.com (press) |
| Christian Bale | Batman Begins | 2005 | $9,000,000 upfront | reported $9M | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Christian Bale | The Dark Knight | 2008 | $10,000,000 upfront, $20,000,000 backend | $10M base plus a reported $20M performance bonus | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Christian Bale | The Dark Knight Rises | 2012 | $15,000,000 upfront | reported $15M | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Hugh Jackman | X-Men | 2000 | $500,000 upfront | reported $500K, unknown-actor casting | screenrant.com (aggregator) |
| Hugh Jackman | Van Helsing | 2004 | $2,000,000 upfront | reported $2M | therichest.com (aggregator) |
| Hugh Jackman | Australia | 2008 | $10,000,000 upfront | reported $10M | therichest.com (aggregator) |
| Hugh Jackman | Real Steel | 2011 | $9,000,000 upfront | reported $9M | therichest.com (aggregator) |
| Hugh Jackman | Deadpool & Wolverine | 2024 | $20,000,000 upfront | reported $20M | wegotthiscovered.com (aggregator) |
| Jodie Foster | Anna and the King | 1999 | $15,000,000 upfront | Variety, 1998: a $15M fee, her biggest to date | variety.com (trade press) |
| Sylvester Stallone | Rocky | 1976 | $35,000 upfront, $2,465,000 backend | his own account to Variety: $35K upfront for writing and starring, 10 net points, about $2.5M in all | variety.com (trade press) |
| Sylvester Stallone | First Blood | 1982 | $3,500,000 upfront | most reports put it at $3.5M (some say $7M); lower figure booked | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Sylvester Stallone | Rambo III | 1988 | $16,000,000 upfront | reported $16M upfront, then among the highest salaries ever | cbr.com (aggregator) |
| Sylvester Stallone | Cop Land | 1997 | $60,000 total | worked for SAG scale, a reported $1,813 a week, roughly $60K across the shoot | tampabay.com (aggregator) |
| Sylvester Stallone | Driven | 2001 | $20,000,000 upfront | reported $20M, one of his two highest paydays | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Sylvester Stallone | D-Tox | 2002 | $20,000,000 upfront | reported $20M (released as Eye See You), one of his two highest paydays | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Jason Statham | Fast & Furious Presents: Hobbs & Shaw | 2019 | $13,000,000 upfront | reported $13M plus EP credit | supercarblondie.com (aggregator) |
| Dwayne Johnson | Fast & Furious Presents: Hobbs & Shaw | 2019 | $20,000,000 upfront | reported $20M upfront | supercarblondie.com (aggregator) |
| Jason Statham | Meg 2: The Trench | 2023 | $25,000,000 upfront | reported $25M | koimoi.com (aggregator) |
| Jason Statham | The Beekeeper | 2024 | $25,000,000 upfront | reported $25M | imdb.com (aggregator) |
| Natalie Portman | Thor: Love and Thunder | 2022 | $1,200,000 upfront | she revealed a $1.2M fee, far below her co-star's | fandomwire.com (first-party statement) |
| Ana de Armas | Ghosted | 2023 | $3,000,000 total | reported $2-5M for the Apple film, middle of the range used | fandomwire.com (aggregator) |
| Jim Carrey | Liar Liar | 1997 | $20,000,000 upfront | reported $20M | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Demi Moore | Striptease | 1996 | $12,500,000 upfront | the then-unprecedented $12.5M that made her the highest-paid actress | deadline.com (trade press) |
| Chris Pratt | Jurassic World: Fallen Kingdom | 2018 | $10,000,000 upfront | reported $10M | screenrant.com (aggregator) |
| Julia Roberts | Leave the World Behind | 2023 | $25,000,000 total | Variety: $25M for the Netflix film | variety.com (trade press) |
| Tom Hanks | The Polar Express | 2004 | $40,000,000 upfront, $60,000,000 backend | Los Angeles Times: $40M plus 20% of first-dollar gross, an estimated $100M total | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Sylvester Stallone | Rocky III | 1982 | $120,000 upfront | his own account: $120K upfront plus back-end points (points not separately quantified) | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Sylvester Stallone | Creed | 2015 | $10,000,000 upfront | reported $10M | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Sylvester Stallone | The Suicide Squad | 2021 | $3,000,000 upfront | reported $3M for the King Shark voice role | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Angelina Jolie | Eternals | 2021 | $35,000,000 total | reported at more than $35M, her heftiest paycheck | parade.com (aggregator) |
| Jennifer Aniston | We're the Millers | 2013 | $5,000,000 upfront | THR's 2013 Money Issue: $5M | hollywoodreporter.com (trade press) |
| Tom Cruise | Top Gun | 1986 | $2,000,000 upfront | reported $2M flat fee for the breakout lead role | screenrant.com (aggregator) |
| Tom Cruise | Mission: Impossible | 1996 | $70,000,000 total | deferred his salary for 22 percent of gross with 100 percent video accounting; Epstein reports the deal earned him more than $70M | slate.com (aggregator) |
| Tom Cruise | Mission: Impossible 2 | 2000 | $92,000,000 total | the renegotiated 30 percent-of-gross deal with a doubled video royalty; Epstein puts his share at $92M | slate.com (aggregator) |
| Tom Cruise | War of the Worlds | 2005 | $100,000,000 total | waived his upfront fee for a reported 20 percent of first-dollar gross, about $100M all-in | en.wikipedia.org (aggregator) |
| Tom Cruise | Top Gun: Maverick | 2022 | $12,500,000 upfront, $87,500,000 backend | $12.5M upfront plus over 10 percent of first-dollar gross; Forbes projects more than $100M all-in | forbes.com (press) |
| Eddie Murphy | 48 Hrs. | 1982 | $450,000 upfront | reported $450K for his film debut; Murphy himself has put it at $200K | yahoo.com (press) |
| Eddie Murphy | Trading Places | 1983 | $350,000 upfront | Murphy's own stated $350K | yahoo.com (press) |
| Eddie Murphy | Beverly Hills Cop | 1984 | $14,500,000 total | renegotiated profit participation before release; total reported at $14.5M | yahoo.com (press) |
| Eddie Murphy | Beverly Hills Cop II | 1987 | $8,000,000 upfront | reported $8M fee | yahoo.com (press) |
| Eddie Murphy | Coming to America | 1988 | $8,000,000 upfront | reported $8M plus 15 percent of rentals | yahoo.com (press) |
| Eddie Murphy | Beverly Hills Cop III | 1994 | $15,000,000 upfront | reported $15M fee | yahoo.com (press) |
| Eddie Murphy | The Nutty Professor | 1996 | $16,000,000 upfront | reported $16M fee for the comeback role | yahoo.com (press) |
| Eddie Murphy | Nutty Professor II: The Klumps | 2000 | $20,000,000 upfront, $40,000,000 backend | $20M plus 20 percent of gross receipts, reported to total over $60M | yahoo.com (press) |
| Eddie Murphy | Dr. Dolittle 2 | 2001 | $20,000,000 upfront | reported $20M fee | yahoo.com (press) |
| Eddie Murphy | The Adventures of Pluto Nash | 2002 | $20,000,000 upfront | reported $20M fee on one of the biggest flops ever made | yahoo.com (press) |
| Eddie Murphy | Mulan | 1998 | $14,000,000 total | reported $14-20M for the Mushu voice role, unconfirmed; entered at the low end | yahoo.com (press) |
| Eddie Murphy | Shrek | 2001 | $3,000,000 total | deferred $350K plus a share of domestic gross that Variety computed at about $3M | abcnews.go.com (aggregator) |
| Eddie Murphy | Shrek 2 | 2004 | $10,000,000 total | reported $10M for the sequel after the cast renegotiated | abcnews.go.com (aggregator) |
| Eddie Murphy | Shrek the Third | 2007 | $10,000,000 total | reported $10-12M range, entered at the low end | yahoo.com (press) |
| Eddie Murphy | Shrek Forever After | 2010 | $8,000,000 total | reported $4M upfront plus points, with totals reported up to $12M; entered at the midpoint | yahoo.com (press) |
| Eddie Murphy | Beverly Hills Cop: Axel F | 2024 | $20,000,000 total | Deadline reported a $20M fee, possibly upwards of $30M, within the film's $150M Netflix budget | screenrant.com (aggregator) |
| Adam Sandler | Happy Gilmore | 1996 | $2,000,000 upfront | reported $2M fee | looper.com (aggregator) |
| Adam Sandler | Anger Management | 2003 | $20,000,000 upfront | the Sony standard deal a THR-published book excerpt documents: $20M against 20 percent of gross | hollywoodreporter.com (trade press) |
| Adam Sandler | 50 First Dates | 2004 | $20,000,000 upfront | the Sony standard deal a THR-published book excerpt documents: $20M against 20 percent of gross | hollywoodreporter.com (trade press) |
| Adam Sandler | Spanglish | 2004 | $20,000,000 upfront | the Sony standard deal a THR-published book excerpt documents: $20M against 20 percent of gross | hollywoodreporter.com (trade press) |
| Adam Sandler | Click | 2006 | $20,000,000 upfront | the Sony standard deal a THR-published book excerpt documents: $20M against 20 percent of gross | hollywoodreporter.com (trade press) |
| Adam Sandler | You Don't Mess with the Zohan | 2008 | $20,000,000 upfront | the Sony standard deal a THR-published book excerpt documents: $20M against 20 percent of gross | hollywoodreporter.com (trade press) |
| Adam Sandler | Grown Ups | 2010 | $20,000,000 upfront | the Sony standard deal a THR-published book excerpt documents: $20M against 20 percent of gross | hollywoodreporter.com (trade press) |
| Adam Sandler | Just Go with It | 2011 | $20,000,000 upfront | the Sony standard deal a THR-published book excerpt documents: $20M against 20 percent of gross | hollywoodreporter.com (trade press) |
| Adam Sandler | Jack and Jill | 2011 | $20,000,000 upfront | the Sony standard deal a THR-published book excerpt documents: $20M against 20 percent of gross | hollywoodreporter.com (trade press) |
| Adam Sandler | That's My Boy | 2012 | $20,000,000 upfront | the Sony standard deal a THR-published book excerpt documents: $20M against 20 percent of gross | hollywoodreporter.com (trade press) |
| Adam Sandler | Grown Ups 2 | 2013 | $20,000,000 upfront | the Sony standard deal a THR-published book excerpt documents: $20M against 20 percent of gross | hollywoodreporter.com (trade press) |
| Adam Sandler | Pixels | 2015 | $5,000,000 upfront | took only $5M upfront in exchange for a bigger cut of the profits, per the THR-published book excerpt | hollywoodreporter.com (trade press) |
| Macaulay Culkin | Uncle Buck | 1989 | $40,000 upfront | reported $40K | aol.com (aggregator) |
| Macaulay Culkin | Home Alone | 1990 | $110,000 upfront | reported $110K for the role that made him the biggest child star in film history | aol.com (aggregator) |
| Macaulay Culkin | Home Alone 2: Lost in New York | 1992 | $4,500,000 upfront | his own account: $4.5M, the record for a child actor, plus 15 percent of merchandising | collider.com (aggregator) |
| Macaulay Culkin | Richie Rich | 1994 | $8,000,000 upfront | reported $8M | aol.com (aggregator) |
| Brad Pitt | Ocean's Eleven | 2001 | $10,000,000 upfront | reported $10M upfront for Ocean's Eleven | theguardian.com (press) |
| Brad Pitt | World War Z | 2013 | $20,000,000 upfront | reported $20M against backend for World War Z | hollywoodreporter.com (trade press) |
| Will Smith | Men in Black 3 | 2012 | $20,000,000 upfront | reported $20M+ for Men in Black 3 | forbes.com (press) |
| Will Smith | Suicide Squad | 2016 | $20,000,000 upfront | reported near $20M for Deadshot in Suicide Squad | forbes.com (press) |
| Dwayne Johnson | Jumanji: Welcome to the Jungle | 2017 | $20,000,000 upfront | reported $20M for Jumanji: Welcome to the Jungle | forbes.com (press) |
| Dwayne Johnson | Red Notice | 2021 | $20,000,000 upfront | reported $20M for Red Notice | forbes.com (press) |
| Robert Downey Jr. | Iron Man | 2008 | $500,000 upfront | early MCU comeback deal reported near $500K upfront before backend participation on later films | hollywoodreporter.com (trade press) |
| George Clooney | Ocean's Eleven | 2001 | $10,000,000 upfront | reported $10M for Ocean's Eleven | theguardian.com (press) |
| Tom Holland | Spider-Man: No Way Home | 2021 | $10,000,000 upfront | reported mid-eight-figures; entered at $10M upfront floor for No Way Home | forbes.com (press) |
| Chris Hemsworth | Thor: Love and Thunder | 2022 | $15,000,000 upfront | reported mid-teen millions for Thor: Love and Thunder | forbes.com (press) |
| Chris Pratt | Guardians of the Galaxy Vol. 3 | 2023 | $15,000,000 upfront | reported mid-teen millions for Guardians Vol. 3 | forbes.com (press) |
| Keanu Reeves | John Wick: Chapter 4 | 2023 | $15,000,000 upfront | reported mid-teen millions for John Wick Chapter 4 | forbes.com (press) |
| Harrison Ford | Indiana Jones and the Dial of Destiny | 2023 | $10,000,000 upfront | reported eight-figure deal for Dial of Destiny; entered at $10M floor | forbes.com (press) |
| Who | Brand | Year | Annual fee | Term | What was disclosed | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Charlize Theron | Raymond Weil | 2005 | $2,571,429/yr | 1.2 yr | $3M for an exclusive watch-ambassador term October 2005 to December 2006, stated in the breach-of-contract court record (Raymond Weil v. Theron, S.D.N.Y. 2008) | caselaw.findlaw.com |
| Julia Roberts | Lancome | 2010 | $10,000,000/yr | 5 yr | $50M five-year global ambassador deal, reported by WWD and trade press | luxurydaily.com |
| Nicole Kidman | Chanel No. 5 | 2004 | $4,000,000/yr | 3 yr | about $4M a year for a three-year global TV and print campaign with a renewal option, per WWD | wwd.com |
| Brad Pitt | Chanel No. 5 | 2012 | $7,000,000/yr | 1 yr | reported $7M fee for the first male No. 5 campaign, industry sources via Fashionista | fashionista.com |
| Credit | Rate | Basis | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| director_scale_floor | $268,008 | DGA 2023-24 theatrical minimum for films over $11M: $20,616 a week across the guaranteed 13-week term (2 prep + 10 shoot + 1 cutting); used as the per-credit floor for producer, director, executive producer, and writer credits since producers have no union minimum | dga.org |
| Lane | Rate | Value | Basis | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| merch | conversion_per_drop_low | 0.005 | 0.5-2% of an engaged audience buys per merch drop; the low end is used with one drop a year assumed | customink.com |
| merch | aov_usd | 25 | unisex tees in the $19-25 range outsell every other creator product category; $25 used | merchtitans.com |
| merch | margin_pod | 0.25 | typical print-on-demand seller margin is about 25% | merchtitans.com |
| merch | margin_owned | 0.50 | owned-brand stores target 40-50% margins; 50% used for owned merch brands | merchtitans.com |
| audience | views_per_fan_per_year | 50 | assumption: an engaged fan watches about one video a week, converting yearly views into unique engaged fans | assumption, published to be challenged |
| membership | take_rate_engaged | 0.001 | industry guides put entertainment-channel membership conversion at 0.5-1% of subscribers; 0.1% of engaged unique fans is used to reflect inactive subscriber bases | fluxnote.io |
| membership | monthly_fee_usd | 4.99 | the most common membership tier price | fluxnote.io |
| membership | creator_share | 0.70 | YouTube pays creators 70% of membership revenue | fluxnote.io |
| music | spotify_subscriber_share | 0.322 | Spotify held 32.2% of global music subscribers at the end of 2024 per MIDiA; other platforms are estimated by scaling Spotify royalties to the whole market | billboard.com |
| music | feature_artist_share | 0.25 | assumption: a featured artist keeps about a quarter of the lead-artist share on tracks they feature on | assumption, published to be challenged |
| shorts | fund_era_rpm_usd | 0.02 | low bound of the measured Shorts RPM range ($0.02-1.48 by niche, AIR Media-Tech study), used to price Shorts Fund era views before February 2023 | air.io |
| residuals | cast_pool_rate | 0.036 | SAG-AFTRA theatrical residuals pay 3.6% of the distributor's gross receipts in the TV windows, with home video on a similar royalty base | wrapbook.com |
| residuals | post_theatrical_dgr_vs_boxoffice | 0.50 | assumption: lifetime post-theatrical distributor receipts approximated at half of theatrical box office | assumption, published to be challenged |
| residuals | lead_share_of_pool | 0.33 | assumption: a lead performer's time-and-salary weighted share of the cast residual pool | assumption, published to be challenged |
| residuals | supporting_share_of_pool | 0.08 | assumption: a supporting performer's share of the cast residual pool | assumption, published to be challenged |
| social | per_1k_post_small | 15 | Instagram sponsored posts run $10-20 per 1,000 followers for accounts under ~1M; $15 midpoint used | influencermarketinghub.com |
| social | per_1k_post_mid | 10 | per-1k rate compresses as accounts scale; $10 per 1,000 used for 1M-25M reach, between the micro benchmark and the mega anchor | influencermarketinghub.com |
| social | per_1k_post_mega | 6 | Hopper HQ 2024 Rich List: Ronaldo/Kardashian/Johnson/Beyonce all land near $6 per 1,000 followers per sponsored post at 300M+ reach; used for 25M+ accounts | hopperhq.com |
| social | sponsored_posts_per_year | 6 | assumption: about six standalone paid brand posts a year across Instagram and TikTok, held below monthly because many brand deals bundle social posts with the YouTube integration already counted | assumption, published to be challenged |
| social | start_year | 2016 | assumption: brand-sponsorship on creator social feeds treated as material from 2016; earlier years scale toward zero with audience | assumption, published to be challenged |
A net worth is a figure in today’s dollars, and ours already is: every year’s income is booked in that year’s money and compounded forward at the market’s actual returns, so a 1995 paycheck arrives at its real present-day value. What we also do is run the fixed-dollar assumptions above through the price level of the year they apply to. A $25 merchandise order, a $4.99 membership, a per-post rate, and the savings-rate brackets are all today’s figures, so we deflate them with the Consumer Price Index before applying them to an earlier year. That keeps a 2010 estimate priced in 2010 money. Film salaries are already era-specific, so they need no adjustment.
| Year | Index (1982-84 = 100) | Basis | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1975 | 53.8 | BLS CPI-U annual average (1982-84=100) | bls.gov |
| 1980 | 82.4 | BLS CPI-U annual average | bls.gov |
| 1985 | 107.6 | BLS CPI-U annual average | bls.gov |
| 1990 | 130.7 | BLS CPI-U annual average | bls.gov |
| 1995 | 152.4 | BLS CPI-U annual average | bls.gov |
| 2000 | 172.2 | BLS CPI-U annual average | bls.gov |
| 2005 | 195.3 | BLS CPI-U annual average | bls.gov |
| 2010 | 218.1 | BLS CPI-U annual average | bls.gov |
| 2015 | 237.0 | BLS CPI-U annual average | bls.gov |
| 2020 | 258.8 | BLS CPI-U annual average | bls.gov |
| 2021 | 271.0 | BLS CPI-U annual average | bls.gov |
| 2022 | 292.7 | BLS CPI-U annual average | bls.gov |
| 2023 | 304.7 | BLS CPI-U annual average | bls.gov |
| 2024 | 313.7 | BLS CPI-U annual average | bls.gov |
| 2025 | 322.1 | BLS CPI-U annual average (estimate pending final release) | bls.gov |
| 2026 | 330.0 | BLS CPI-U (2026 partial-year estimate) | bls.gov |
A documented property purchase adds only its appreciation, never the purchase price, since the money spent is already counted in the person’s savings. We grow each documented purchase at its metro’s long-run rate below, net a 7% selling cost. Business stakes enter from a real transaction where one exists, otherwise revenue times a comparable multiple, with a 25% discount for a minority holding in a private company. Channel memberships are counted only for the channels we confirmed have them switched on: of the roster, seven do and the rest do not, so we do not estimate membership income for a channel that has the feature turned off.
| Metro | Rate | Basis | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| US | 4.5% | long-run US national nominal home-price appreciation, S&P/Case-Shiller National Index | fred.stlouisfed.org |
| US-CA | 6.0% | long-run Los Angeles / coastal California nominal appreciation, S&P/Case-Shiller LA Index | fred.stlouisfed.org |
| US-NY | 5.0% | long-run New York metro nominal appreciation, S&P/Case-Shiller NY Index | fred.stlouisfed.org |
| US-FL | 5.5% | long-run Miami / South Florida nominal appreciation, S&P/Case-Shiller Miami Index | fred.stlouisfed.org |
| UK | 5.0% | long-run UK nominal house-price appreciation, Nationwide House Price Index | nationwidehousepriceindex.co.uk |
| selling_costs | 7% | agent commission plus closing and transfer costs on a sale, standard 6-8% (7% midpoint) | bankrate.com |
| Cuba | 3.0% | assumption: thin foreign-currency Havana market; Cuban outlets report premium-district prices rising, modest nominal appreciation assumed | en.cibercuba.com |
| France | 4.0% | long-run French nominal house-price appreciation, INSEE-Notaires index | insee.fr |
| Australia | 5.5% | long-run Australian capital-city nominal appreciation, ABS/CoreLogic | abs.gov.au |
| Cambodia | 4.0% | assumption: thin market; Phnom Penh/BKK-area price reporting shows steady nominal growth | realestate.com.kh |
| Greece | 3.0% | assumption: Aegean island holiday-home market; steady nominal growth | bankofgreece.gr |
| Bahamas | 4.5% | assumption: private-island and coastal market tracks US coastal appreciation | bahamasrealty.com |
| Belize | 4.0% | assumption: thin coastal market; modest nominal growth | belizetourismboard.org |
| Fee | Rate | Applies to | Basis | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| agent | 10% | all_actors | talent agency commission capped at 10% under SAG-AFTRA franchise rules; the industry standard | sagaftra.org |
| attorney | 5% | all_actors | entertainment attorney convention of 5% of deals, standard industry practice per trade coverage | hollywoodreporter.com |
| manager | 10% | documented_only | business/talent manager 10% applied only where a manager relationship is documented (e.g. Depp x TMG per 2017 court filings) | hollywoodreporter.com |
A model that publishes its rates also has to publish its misses. We grade ours against every answer we can find that did not come from another estimator: court records, Companies House filings, real transactions, and on-the-record statements. Street estimates never count as ground truth, because they are somebody else’s model. Three numbers per test, per our published protocol: the median absolute error, the direction of the bias, and the worst miss. Last computed 2026-07-13, and recomputed with every model release.
The engine’s main modeled component prices an undisclosed lead role at the median of disclosed salaries for its era and budget band, capped at 15% of the film’s budget. We turned that mechanism on its own table: for each of the 88 disclosed established-lead salaries above, we removed the row, rebuilt the medians without it, and predicted the figure cold. Median absolute error: 40%. The signed median is -25% and 68% of predictions come in low, so the mechanism leans under, the direction a floor should lean. 70% of predictions land within 50% of the true figure.
| Metric | Value | The story |
|---|---|---|
| Predictions tested | 88 | |
| Median absolute error | 40% | |
| Bias direction | under (68% of predictions low, signed median -25%) | |
| Worst overshoot | +1,567% | Natalie Portman took a reported $1,200,000 scale fee on Thor: Love and Thunder while the comps said millions; a star deliberately working below quote is invisible to comps |
| Worst undershoot | -78% | Sandra Bullock on The Blind Side (2009), priced just as her market rate jumped |
| Case | Model, blind | Documented | Error | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KSI (blind income model vs Companies House register) | $18,354,297 | $227,767,471 | -92% | Solaris UK Holdings and four other companies: filed net assets x his registered PSC bands, GBP at 1.27 the income model never saw a Prime distribution because none was ever documented; the register caught what the exclusions policy forced the model to leave out. Register data is an input from now on, so this stays the blind run of record. |
| Ali-A (blind income model vs Companies House register) | $9,273,781 | $10,447,310 | -11% | Ali-A Entertainment Limited filed net assets x PSC band, GBP at 1.27 |
| Cars & Bids valuation (Doug DeMuro, model v1) | $34,000,000 | $62,000,000 | -45% | The Chernin Group's January 2023 majority investment implied roughly $62M; Doug has since described it as an $80M sale |
| Theorist Media valuation (MatPat, model v1) | $27,100,000 | $50,000,000 | -46% | the undisclosed Lunar X deal was pegged at $40-60M by industry coverage; midpoint used |
Johnny Depp career gross 2003-2016: the model counts $465,651,623 of film income against the $650,000,000 his former managers documented in court, an error of -28%. film income only; the gap is the excluded lanes (endorsements, music, art), so under is the designed direction.
| Case | Documented floor | Model | Result | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DanTDM | $8,219,786 | $36,465,297 | holds | TheDiamondminecart Limited and two other companies, filed net assets x PSC bands |
| Mrwhosetheboss | $5,918,871 | $12,549,506 | holds | Boss Global Media and Boss Global Properties, filed net assets x PSC bands |
| Emma Watson | $-360,277.00 | $35,955,510 | holds | Breadcrumb Productions filed net assets (negative) x PSC band |
| Jason Statham | $540,616 | $122,718,443 | holds | eight UK companies, filed net assets x PSC bands |
| Mark Rober / CrunchLabs | $50,000,000 | $49,400,000 | holds | Rober has said he turned down a $50M investment offer; the model's blind valuation sits just under it |
The pattern across all four tests is the same: the model misses low far more often than high, by roughly the size of whatever the exclusions policy forced it to leave out. The KSI row is the clearest lesson this site has produced: no public income lane ever documented a Prime distribution, so the blind model saw 8% of what his own company filings later showed. That is why register data is now an input. If a documented number ever prints below one of our figures, that row goes here too, and the model gets corrected in public.
One rule sits above the hierarchy: outside sources supply individual facts only. A salary, a filing, a settlement, a per-episode fee. No other outlet’s net worth estimate is ever an input to this model, a number we calibrate toward, or ground truth in the scorecard above. We compute the aggregate ourselves, from the facts, and publish every step.
Our sourcing hierarchy, strongest first: official records (company registries, court filings), first-party statements on the record, trade press (Variety, The Hollywood Reporter, Deadline), general press, and last, secondary compilations. One source is banned outright: CelebrityNetWorth, which prints dollar figures without citations and blocks archiving. Any figure that existed only there is treated as undisclosed, and the film models from its budget instead. Remaining secondary sources are accepted only where they attribute a figure to trade or press reporting, are always labeled as what they are, and get replaced whenever the underlying primary report surfaces. Citations point at the outlet that originally reported a figure wherever that original is locatable online; where it exists only in pre-internet print, the verified secondary stands in, names the original publication in the row, and stays on the upgrade queue. The scorecard above exists partly to measure what a table with this mix of sources actually delivers. Below is every domain cited anywhere in the model, with its class and how many citations rest on it.
| Source | Class | Citations | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|
| YouTube Data API (googleapis.com) | official record | measured views, catalog, disclosure flags | |
| Companies House API (company-information.service.gov.uk) | official record | UK company accounts and PSC registers | |
| Internet Archive Wayback Machine (web.archive.org) | measured data source | historical channel totals and citation archiving | |
| Kworb (kworb.net) | measured data source | music streaming counts | |
| sec.gov | official record | 1 | multiples comps |
| taxfoundation.org | government and academic | 26 | tax rates |
| tax.ny.gov | government and academic | 14 | tax rates |
| irs.gov | government and academic | 13 | tax rates |
| ifs.org.uk | government and academic | 9 | tax rates |
| dor.ms.gov | government and academic | 7 | tax rates |
| ato.gov.au | government and academic | 6 | tax rates |
| piketty.pse.ens.fr | government and academic | 4 | savings rates |
| gov.uk | government and academic | 2 | tax rates |
| sagaftra.org | government and academic | 1 | actor rep fees |
| hollywoodreporter.com | trade press | 28 | actor rep fees, actor salary disclosures, person configs |
| variety.com | trade press | 18 | actor salary disclosures, person configs |
| deadline.com | trade press | 9 | actor salary disclosures, person configs |
| tubefilter.com | trade press | 7 | multiples comps, person configs, rpm disclosures |
| indiewire.com | trade press | 3 | actor salary disclosures |
| forbes.com | press | 20 | actor salary disclosures, person configs |
| yahoo.com | press | 19 | actor salary disclosures, person configs |
| newsnationnow.com | press | 6 | person configs |
| etonline.com | press | 4 | actor salary disclosures |
| theguardian.com | press | 2 | actor salary disclosures |
| history.com | press | 1 | actor salary disclosures |
| cinemablend.com | press | 1 | actor salary disclosures |
| cheatsheet.com | press | 1 | actor salary disclosures |
| wsj.com | press | 1 | stream payouts |
| bbc.com | press | 1 | person configs |
| time.com | press | 1 | person configs |
| cnbc.com | press | 1 | person configs |
| bls.gov | aggregator | 52 | cpi index |
| parade.com | aggregator | 43 | actor salary disclosures, person configs |
| slickcharts.com | aggregator | 42 | benchmark returns |
| tax.illinois.gov | aggregator | 18 | tax rates |
| screenrant.com | aggregator | 16 | actor salary disclosures, person configs |
| taxsummaries.pwc.com | aggregator | 15 | tax rates |
| dor.sc.gov | aggregator | 13 | tax rates |
| incometaxindia.gov.in | aggregator | 11 | tax rates |
| nj.gov | aggregator | 10 | tax rates |
| dor.georgia.gov | aggregator | 9 | tax rates |
| revenue.louisiana.gov | aggregator | 9 | tax rates |
| content.leg.colorado.gov | aggregator | 9 | tax rates |
| en.wikipedia.org | aggregator | 8 | actor salary disclosures, person configs |
| sede.agenciatributaria.gob.es | aggregator | 8 | tax rates |
| mass.gov | aggregator | 8 | tax rates |
| archive.legmt.gov | aggregator | 8 | tax rates |
| tfhawaii.org | aggregator | 8 | tax rates |
| dexerto.com | aggregator | 8 | person configs |
| ncdor.gov | aggregator | 7 | tax rates |
| azdor.gov | aggregator | 7 | tax rates |
| tax.newmexico.gov | aggregator | 7 | tax rates |
| revenue.nebraska.gov | aggregator | 7 | tax rates |
| outlierkit.com | aggregator | 6 | rpm disclosures, sponsor cpm sources |
| cga.ct.gov | aggregator | 6 | tax rates |
| tax.virginia.gov | aggregator | 6 | tax rates |
| hollywood.com | aggregator | 6 | person configs |
| gov.br | aggregator | 5 | tax rates |
| twitch.tv | aggregator | 5 | person configs |
| therichest.com | aggregator | 4 | actor salary disclosures |
| billboard.com | aggregator | 4 | lane benchmarks, person configs |
| air.io | aggregator | 4 | lane benchmarks, rpm disclosures |
| fred.stlouisfed.org | aggregator | 4 | real estate rates |
| portal.ct.gov | aggregator | 4 | tax rates |
| www2.gov.bc.ca | aggregator | 4 | tax rates |
| pollstar.com | aggregator | 4 | person configs |
| slate.com | aggregator | 3 | actor salary disclosures, person configs |
| aol.com | aggregator | 3 | actor salary disclosures |
| merchtitans.com | aggregator | 3 | lane benchmarks |
| fluxnote.io | aggregator | 3 | lane benchmarks |
| influencermarketinghub.com | aggregator | 3 | lane benchmarks, rpm disclosures |
| post-bridge.com | aggregator | 3 | rpm disclosures |
| miraflow.ai | aggregator | 3 | rpm disclosures |
| creatorsagency.co | aggregator | 3 | sponsor cpm sources |
| montanabudget.org | aggregator | 3 | tax rates |
| hitaxfairness.org | aggregator | 3 | tax rates |
| revenue.wi.gov | aggregator | 3 | tax rates |
| dor.mo.gov | aggregator | 3 | tax rates |
| ksrevenue.gov | aggregator | 3 | tax rates |
| oregon.gov | aggregator | 3 | tax rates |
| bir.gov.ph | aggregator | 3 | tax rates |
| news.pollstar.com | aggregator | 3 | person configs |
| riaa.com | aggregator | 3 | person configs |
| filmindustry.network | aggregator | 2 | actor salary disclosures |
| supercarblondie.com | aggregator | 2 | actor salary disclosures |
| imdb.com | aggregator | 2 | actor salary disclosures, person configs |
| fandomwire.com | aggregator | 2 | actor salary disclosures |
| abcnews.go.com | aggregator | 2 | actor salary disclosures |
| collider.com | aggregator | 2 | actor salary disclosures, person configs |
| dga.org | aggregator | 2 | credit scale, person configs |
| wwd.com | aggregator | 2 | endorsement disclosures, person configs |
| axios.com | aggregator | 2 | multiples comps |
| vidchops.com | aggregator | 2 | rpm disclosures |
| youtube.com | aggregator | 2 | rpm disclosures |
| tax.vermont.gov | aggregator | 2 | tax rates |
| impots.gouv.fr | aggregator | 2 | tax rates |
| tax.ohio.gov | aggregator | 2 | tax rates |
| hklaw.com | aggregator | 2 | tax rates |
| in.gov | aggregator | 2 | tax rates |
| tax.org.uk | aggregator | 2 | tax rates |
| gov.hk | aggregator | 2 | tax rates |
| mtrevenue.gov | aggregator | 2 | tax rates |
| en.service-public.mc | aggregator | 2 | tax rates |
| agenziaentrate.gov.it | aggregator | 2 | tax rates |
| zatca.gov.sa | aggregator | 2 | tax rates |
| fox13seattle.com | aggregator | 2 | person configs |
| the-numbers.com | aggregator | 2 | person configs |
| prnewswire.com | aggregator | 2 | person configs |
| kick.com | aggregator | 2 | person configs |
| tiktok.com | aggregator | 2 | person configs |
| scmp.com | aggregator | 2 | person configs |
| faroutmagazine.co.uk | aggregator | 1 | actor salary disclosures |
| wegotthiscovered.com | aggregator | 1 | actor salary disclosures |
| cbr.com | aggregator | 1 | actor salary disclosures |
| tampabay.com | aggregator | 1 | actor salary disclosures |
| koimoi.com | aggregator | 1 | actor salary disclosures |
| looper.com | aggregator | 1 | actor salary disclosures |
| rbcwealthmanagement.com | aggregator | 1 | benchmark returns |
| caselaw.findlaw.com | aggregator | 1 | endorsement disclosures |
| luxurydaily.com | aggregator | 1 | endorsement disclosures |
| fashionista.com | aggregator | 1 | endorsement disclosures |
| customink.com | aggregator | 1 | lane benchmarks |
| wrapbook.com | aggregator | 1 | lane benchmarks |
| hopperhq.com | aggregator | 1 | lane benchmarks |
| retaildive.com | aggregator | 1 | multiples comps |
| linkedin.com | aggregator | 1 | multiples comps |
| nationwidehousepriceindex.co.uk | aggregator | 1 | real estate rates |
| bankrate.com | aggregator | 1 | real estate rates |
| en.cibercuba.com | aggregator | 1 | real estate rates |
| insee.fr | aggregator | 1 | real estate rates |
| abs.gov.au | aggregator | 1 | real estate rates |
| realestate.com.kh | aggregator | 1 | real estate rates |
| bankofgreece.gr | aggregator | 1 | real estate rates |
| bahamasrealty.com | aggregator | 1 | real estate rates |
| belizetourismboard.org | aggregator | 1 | real estate rates |
| blackhatworld.com | aggregator | 1 | rpm disclosures |
| upgrowth.in | aggregator | 1 | rpm disclosures |
| gyre.pro | aggregator | 1 | rpm disclosures |
| pastory.app | aggregator | 1 | rpm disclosures |
| influencerfee.com | aggregator | 1 | sponsor cpm sources |
| creatorsjet.com | aggregator | 1 | sponsor cpm sources |
| chartlex.com | aggregator | 1 | stream payouts |
| artists.spotify.com | aggregator | 1 | stream payouts |
| distrokid.com | aggregator | 1 | stream payouts |
| skatteverket.se | aggregator | 1 | tax rates |
| nta.go.jp | aggregator | 1 | tax rates |
| tax.hawaii.gov | aggregator | 1 | tax rates |
| okdiario.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| content.time.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| diffuser.fm | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| thelist.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| thewrap.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| ir.hanesbrands.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| globalnews.ca | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| tmz.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| eonline.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| deseret.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| playbill.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| benzinga.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| chiefmarketer.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| upi.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| publishersweekly.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| streeteasy.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| texasmonthly.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| amlu.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| campaignlive.co.uk | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| sothebys.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| mutualart.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| money.cnn.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| theverge.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| win.gg | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| x.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| inverse.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| playboard.co | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| streamscharts.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| investors.dicks.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| si.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| sherdog.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| cbsnews.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| marketingbrew.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| businesswire.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| hypebeast.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| cbinsights.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| espn.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| badlefthook.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| boxinginsider.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| en.cryptonomist.ch | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| techcrunch.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| migrationology.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| ninja.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| pokimane.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| sportskeeda.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| bloomberg.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| stack3d.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| capitalfm.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| buzzfeednews.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
| esportsearnings.com | aggregator | 1 | person configs |
Each page lists its raw inputs, retrieval dates, and rate-table version. The YouTube Data API is free, Kworb and the Internet Archive are public, and every rate above cites its source. Apply the rates to the measured numbers year by year, as shown in each page’s table, and you will land on our figure. If you cannot, write to us, because one of us has a bug.
Before we shifted our focus to software and SaaS, NetWorth Explained built its reputation on transparent celebrity net worth estimates. Rather than publishing a single headline figure, we modeled each person's earnings from the ground up: what a role typically pays as a share of a film's budget, how much of the box office flows back to the talent, the cut taken by agents and managers, realistic investment returns, and the cost of the lifestyle that money supports. The tables below show the exact assumptions behind the film model we use for actors, followed by the model we use for YouTubers and creators, and finally a look at how our numbers have held up when real deal prices became public. We deliberately keep every input conservative so the final number reflects what someone is worth at a minimum.
| Role | % of Movie Budget |
|---|---|
| Lead | 8.5% |
| Lead + S | 9.5% |
| Lead + D | 10.5% |
| Lead + DS | 11.5% |
| Supporting | 3.5% |
| Supporting + S | 4.0% |
| Supporting + D | 4.5% |
| Supporting + DS | 5.0% |
| Gross points as a percentage of box office as Lead + EP | 5.0% |
| Gross points as a percentage of box office as Lead | 4.0% |
| Gross points as a percentage of box office as Supporting + EP | 3.0% |
| Gross points as a percentage of box office as Supporting | 1.0% |
| Return on investment after expenses | 6.5% |
| Film studio box office retention | 40.0% |
| Attorney, business manager and agent commission | 15.0% |
| Withdrawn from cumulative annually | 20.0% |
| Maximum withdrawal from cumulative annually | $7,382,182 |
| Maximum upfront pay derived from the budget | $25,000,000 |
| Home maintenance (cleaning, landscaping, repairs, property taxes) | $400,000 |
| Personal assistant | $85,000 |
| Secretary | $65,000 |
| Security (x4) | $460,000 |
| Publicist | $70,000 |
| Aircraft charter ($8,000 an hour x 200 hours, or 10 international roundtrips) | $1,600,000 |
| Vacation ($7,500 a day x 90 days) | $675,000 |
| Dining ($120 per person x 4 people x 365 days) | $175,200 |
| Transportation | $430,000 |
| Clothing ($4,500 x 12 outfits) | $54,000 |
| Gifts & donations | $46,000 |
| Total | $4,060,200 |
| Pre-tax withdrawal amount at 45% tax rate | $7,382,182 |
Before we created this publication, there wasn't a single website that showed exactly how someone's net worth was calculated. Even major publications refused to disclose their methods, hiding behind vague claims of a "proprietary algorithm." Math is not a secret; it's simply a shield from scrutiny.
That's why our math and reasoning is always transparent. That's NetWorth Explained.